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GMO Corn, Mexico, and Coloniality
Ernesto Herndndez-L6pez*
ABSTRACT

Genetically modified ("GMO")
corn germinates legal
controversies in Mixico. Since 2013, Mexican courts have temporarily
suspended GMO corn because it threatens biodiversity. In the
Colectividad del Maiz lawsuit, courts have prohibited Mixico from
issuing commercial GMO permits while the litigation continues.
Companies like Monsanto need these permits to sell GMO seeds. Corn is
the most essential food item for millions of Mexicans and is central to
Mexican culture. Mexicans wait for Colectividad del Maiz's resolution,
siding with biodiversity or GMOs. This Article describes scientific GMO
controversies and analyzes biosecurity, class-action, and international
environmental law. It argues that this corn fight feeds larger moral
questions about biotechnology and Mixico's sovereignty. Courts and
policy makers respond to these controversies with their sovereignpowers.
Decolonial theory shows how assumptions about economics, law, and
ideology rooted in historical colonial structures-"coloniality"-shape
these responses. This Article illustrates the significance of coloniality to
how the government responds to GMOs, at a time when GMO safety is
increasingly questioned in Mixico and elsewhere.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A dispute over genetically modified organism (GMO) regulations
set the table for an intense legal battle over corn, M6xico's most sacred
food item.' Since the 2013 lawsuit Colectividad del Maiz, courts have
ordered the Mexican government to stop issuing commercial permits for
GMO corn. 2 GMOs are created by inserting the genetic material of one
1.
Doctor Alma Pineyro-Nelson provides a concise description of public controversies over
GMO corn beginning in 2001. She elaborates on the scientific, cultural, legal, political, and, thus,
epistemic perspectives of this debate in M6xico. Alma Pineyro-Nelson, Un Ejemplo de Controversia
Cientifica: El Debate en Torno a la Introducci6n de Maiz Geniticamente Modificado en Mixico, in
NATURALEZA, CIENCIA Y SOCIEDAD: 40 AIOS DE PENSAMIENTO CRITICO INTERDISCIPLINARIO EN LA

FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS, UNAM (Fabrizzio Guerrero McManus et al. eds., 2016).
2.
Nota Informativa, Acci6n colectiva contra la autorizaci6n de la liberaci6n para
comercializar maiz transgenico DGCS/NI: 41/2013, 14-10-2013 (Mex.) [hereinafter Nota
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organism into another organism. 3 A trial court issued this order soon
after the filing of a demanda colectica, a procedure that is similar to a
class action. The Colectividad4 sued M6xico's secretary of agriculture
along with foreign seed companies, arguing that there has been an
unauthorized release of GMO corn that puts M6xico's biodiversity at
serious risk.5 The secretary approves commercial permits needed to test
and sell GMO seeds in M6xico. For over six years, the Colectividad,
government agencies, and seed companies, including Monsanto and
Pioneer-Dupont, have been in litigation over demandas colectivas,
injunctive orders, and other measures to monitor GMO farming.6
Despite rulings from appellate courts and an anticipated decision from
M6xico's highest court, the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacidn
(SCJN),7 this corn fight implicates many more issues, such as
Informativa]. The US Department of Agriculture describes this dispute as a "legal stalemate," with
"no timeline" for an end, after "activists" filed a class action on July 5, 2013. It reports that in
September of 2013, a judge ordered a stop of experimental and commercial planting of GMO corn.
It adds that, since then, biotechnology companies, public-sector biotechnology researchers, and
field trials for GMO corn have indeed stopped. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN MX8050, MEXICO:
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY ANNUAL:

UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL

BIOTECHNOLOGY 4 (2018), https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20AnnualMexico%20CityMexico_10-302018.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5DG-BHQZ] [hereinafter GAIN MX8050].
3.
Gabriel Rangel, From Corgis to Corn: A Brief Look at the Long History of GMO
Technology, HARv. SITN (Aug. 9, 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2015/from-corgis-tocorn-a-brief-look-at-the-long-history-of-gmo-technology/ [https://perma.cc/MJA9-LTH8].
4.
For the sake of simplicity, this Article refers to the collective as the Colectividad and
the dispute as Colectividaddel Maiz. The Colectividad is a collective that was formed by fifty-three
persons in order to submit a demanda colectiva to stop the Mexican government from authorizing
permits to plant GMO corn. For the details on this collective entity, see Adelita San Vicente & Ana
Ruiz Diaz, Colectividad Demandante, DEMANDA COLECTIVA MAiZ, http://demandacolectivamaiz.mx/wp/quienesomos [https://perma.cc/GAL5-FQWL] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). For a
description of demandas colectivas in M6xico, see infra Part IV. (Colectividad del Maiz is also
referred to as Colectiva del Maiz or Acci6n Colectiva del Maiz).
5.
The Colectividad provides its demanda (complaint) online. See Demanda Contra
el Maiz Transgenico, DEMANDA COLECTIVA MAiZ (July 5, 2013), http://demandacolectivamaiz.mx/wp/demanda-contra-el-maiz-transgenico [https://perma.cc/DJH6-7XLX]. Its periodic
updates are also online. See Demanda Informes, DEMANDA COLECTIVA MAiZ (July 5, 2013),
http://demandacolectivamaiz.mx/wp/demanda-informes [https://perma.cc/RXF3-QXP8].
6.
See Ang6lica
Enciso
L.,
Sin Respuesta de
Sagarpa y
Semarnat,
Acci6n
Colectiva
Contra
Transginicos,
JORNADA
(Mar.
28,
2019),
https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/03/28/sociedad/036nlsoc# [https://perma.cc/8RMU-TGU3]. The
demanda specifically listed the secretary of agriculture, the secretary of the environment and
natural resources, and companies with pilot and experimental GMO corn authorizations, such as
Semillas y Agroproductos Monsanto, Monsanto Comercial, Dow Agrosciences de M6xico,
Pioneer-Dupont, and Syngenta Agro. Demanda Contra el Maiz Transgenico, supra note 5.
7.
See Enciso L., supra note 6. While the court order is still effective, the lawsuit
remains in proceedings at the SCJN. See Expediente Maiz, Tenth Third Semestral Report
Colective Colective Demand, FACEBOOK (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/ExpedienteMaiz/posts/2531546440436311?_tn_=K-R [https://perma.cc/JP29-YMEZ].
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biodiversity, food security, and international sovereignty.8 It shows how
postcolonial economics, politics, and ideology frame M6xico's sovereign
struggle with biodiversity.
Many Mexicans actively oppose GMO corn because M6xico has
a long tradition of growing genetically diverse corn.9 GMO corn
genomes travel easily,10 even if unintentionally, and alter the genetic
structure of non-GMO corn plants known as landraces. 11 This creates
multiple levels of danger, including impacts on the genetic structure of
landraces and environmental, agricultural, and socioeconomic
impacts. 12 Because of this, the Colectividad argues that M6xico's
biodiversity in corn requires legal protection. 13 M6xico is the "center of
origin" for corn, a scientific designation recognizing where the grain was
first cultivated.14 It is also a "center of diversity" for corn, a scientific
8.
For a brief description of how these court rulings impact the environment and food
security, see Susan Burns, Mexican Courts Are Bigger than AgriculturalGiant, Monsanto Mexico:
52 YEAR REV. 643 (2018). For their impact on sovereignty, see infra Part V. Scholars Joel
Wainwright and Kristin Mercer place controversies about GMO corn in the context of debates
about scientific proof, the socioeconomic challenges for corn farmers, and the relations between the
United States and M6xico. They identify critiques of GMOs operating on six scales, specific to
genes, organisms, farmer households, landscape, culture, and morality. Joel Wainwright & Kristin
L. Mercer, Transnational Transgenes: The Political Ecology of Maize in Mexico, in GLOBAL
POLITICAL ECOLOGIES 412, 414-16 (Richard Peet et al. eds., 2011).
9.
Farming choices are key to maintaining corn diversity. Cf Idalia C. Rojas-Barrera et
al., Contemporary Evolution of Maize Landraces and Their Wild Relatives Influenced by Gene
Flow with Modern Maize Varieties, 116 PNAS 21302, 21302-11 (Oct. 15, 2019). For a brief
description of how GMO corn impacts genetic diversity, see Alex Taylor, GMOs and the Risk to
Our Genetic Heritage, SCI. CONNECTED MAG. (June 6, 2017), https://magazine.scienceconnected.org/20 17/06/gmos-risk-genetic-heritage [https://perma.cc/NZ24-URPG].
10.

See TIMOTHY A. WISE, EATING TOMORROW: AGRIBUSINESS, FAMILY FARMERS, AND THE

BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF FOOD 184-185 (2019).

11.

In Spanish, landrace corn is maiz nativo or maiz criollo. ELIZABETH FITTING, THE

STRUGGLE FOR MAIZE:

CAMPESINOS,

WORKERS, AND

TRANSGENIC

CORN IN THE MEXICAN

COUNTRYSIDE 40 (2010).

12.
There are five levels of danger: recombinant transgenes, including genes that codify
plant proteins and the ordering for these; the sequencing of these transgenes in the host plant for
which its morphology and physiology depend; the environmental context where these plants are
grown; the agricultural impacts in locations where GMOs are released; and the socioeconomic
impacts of GMO plots. See Elena R. Alvarez-Buylla et al., Incertidumbres,Riesgos y Peligros de la
Liberaci6n de Maiz Transginico en Mixico, in EL MAiZ EN PELIGRO ANTE LOS TRANSG NICOS 113

(Elena Alvarez-Buylla & Alma Pineyro-Nelson eds., 2013).
The Colectividad aims to protect landraces that make up 75 percent of the corn plots
13.
in M6xico, the rights of campesino farmer families, 70 percent of the population that lives in
poverty, and the health of all Mexicans whose principle food staple is corn. It adds that GMO corn
would subject Mexicans to pesticides and GMO transgenes in their diet. See Mercedes, Tres Afios
de Protecci6n Juridica a las Siembras de Maiz, ViA ORGANICA (July 7, 2016), https://viaorganica.org/tres-anos-de-proteccion-juridica-las-siembras-de-maiz [https://perma.cc/K3GL-FLWV].
14.
Alma Pineyro-Nelson et al., Transgenes in Mexican Maize: Molecular Evidence and
Methodological Considerations for GMO Detection in Landrace Populations, 18 MOLECULAR
ECOLOGY 750, 750 (2009). For an explanation of center of origin and center of diversity, their
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designation for locations with extreme species diversity. 15 Impressively,
nearly sixty corn landraces grow in M6xico. 16 For centuries, Mexican
farmers have maintained this biodiversity on milpas, small plots with
a variety of corn plants, beans, and squash.1 7 On varied terrain, milpas
nurture plant strains that adapt to drought, pests, soil conditions, and
climate change.18 With this diversity, farmers develop new corn
varieties.19 Because of this, M6xico is the world's largest, most diverse,
and oldest living genetic resource for corn. 20
Corn is extremely significant in Mexican culture. 21 For millions
of Mexicans, corn symbolizes respect for the earth and a connection to
indigenous civilizations. 22 Corn is the most widely consumed crop in
M6xico, 2 3 used in tortillas, tamales, huaraches, sopes, totopos, pulque,
tostadas, pozole, and much more. 24 Its landraces do not grow on

&

definitions and histories, and M6xico's classifications for corn, see Luz Maria Mera Ovando
Cristina Mapes S6nchez, El Maiz. Aspectos Biol6gicos, in ORIGEN Y DIVERSIFICACION DEL MAfz 19,
23-27 (Takeo Angel Kato Yamakake et al. eds., 2009).
15.
See E. Gonz6lez-Ortega et al., Pervasive Presence of Transgenes and Glyphosate in
Maize-DerivedFood in Mexico, 41 AGROECOLOGY & SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYS. 1146, 1146 (2017).
16.

Jos6 Sarukh6n K., Prefacio, in EL MAiZ EN PELIGRO ANTE LOS TRANSGtNICOS 11, 12

&

(Elena Alvarez-Buylla & Alma Pineyro-Nelson eds., 2013); Executive Summary, in ORIGEN Y
DIVERSIFICACION DEL MAiz 11 (Takeo Angel Kato Yamakake et al. eds., 2009).
17.
For a description of how milpa plots grow different types of corn to preserve
biodiversity, see Alejandro Nadal, Mexico's Corn-ProducingSector: A Commentary, 23 AGRIC.
HUM. VALUES 33, 35 (2006).

18.
See Gonz6lez-Ortega et al., supra note 15, at 1146-47.
19.
Corn is grown in at least 164 countries, with a total production of over one
billion metric tons. Crop: Maize, CROP TRUST, https://www.croptrust.org/crop/maize
[https://perma.cc/GQB8-5DYG] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).
20.
See Alejandro Nadal, Mexican Corn: Genetic Variability and Trade Liberalization 1
(El Colegio de M6xico Programa Sobre Ciencia, Tecnologia y Desarrollo, Working Paper No. 1-06,
2000).
21.
For a description of corn's historic, cultural, and agricultural importance in
M6xico, see Matthew O'Leary, Maize: From Mexico to the World, INT'L MAIZE & WHEAT
IMPROVEMENT CTR. (May 20, 2016), https://www.cimmyt.org/blogs/maize-from-mexico-to-theworld [https://perma.cc/2R94-4JYB]. GMO corn threatens biodiversity along with cultural
traditions, rural economies, and agriculture. See EDIT ANTAL ET AL., MAIZE AND BIOSECURITY IN
MEXICO: DEBATE AND PRACTICE 1-2 (2007).

22.
See Eckart Boege, El Patrimonio Biocultural de los Pueblos Indigenas de M6xico 23
(2008).
23.
It is the main agricultural crop in terms of production and crop area as well as the
main source of energy and nutrients. Mexican consumption is six times the world average. ALICIA
GUTItRREZ GONZALEZ, THE PROTECTION OF MAIZE UNDER THE MEXICAN BIOSAFETY LAW:

ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 57 (Universitatsverlag Gottingen 2010). GMO corn threatens corn as
used in the Mexican diet. See Mexico: The Dangers of IndustrializedCorn and its ProcessedEdible
Products, GRAIN (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.grain.org/en/article/5906-mexico-the-dangers-of-industrial-corn-and-its-processed-edible-products [https://perma.cc/4FJP-QCU5].
24.
Landrace corn, because of sensory varieties, is preferred for certain Mexican dishes.
See Rojas-Barrera et al., supra note 9, at 21303. It is grown on particular lands and at times is
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industrial farms. Instead, they grow on small plots with an emphasis
on reserving seeds for the future. Maiz is the Spanish term for
corn, while "corn" and "maize" generally refer to the same thing in
English-that is, the plant zea mays. 25 This Article uses the terms
maiz," "maize," and "corn" interchangeably.
Despite this rich corn heritage, M6xico is highly sensitive to
global corn markets. 26 Corn is the most widely grown crop in the
world. 27 Corn farmers and corn advocates fear that biodiversity will be
threatened if seed companies plant GMO corn on a commercial scale in
M6xico. 2 8 The country could be subject to foreign-owned biotechnology
to maintain genetic diversity. 29 This anxiety comes after economic

reforms displaced national corn production two decades ago. Previously,
corn was the largest source of rural employment. 30 Additionally, M6xico
is not self-sufficient in corn. 3 1 This became painfully obvious with the

"tortilla crisis" in 2008, when a spike in global demand led to soaring
prices for corn in M6xico. 32 The country continues to import a great deal
of corn and processed corn products. 33 The majority of this imported
corn is from the United States and is GMO corn. 34 The main use for
imported GMO corn is animal feed. 35
used for particular dishes. See Antonio Turrent Fern6ndez, Timothy A. Wise & Elise Garvey,
Achieving Mexico's Maize Potential 9 (Tufts Univ., Global Dev. & Envt'l Inst., Working Paper No.
12-03, 2012).
25.
GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA's LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE 143 (Carolyn
L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002).
26.
See 0' Leary, supra note 21.
27.
Corn is grown in at least 164 countries, with a total production of over one billion
metric tons. Crop: Maize, supra note 19.
28.
See Cristian Rodriguez, 59 Variedades de Maiz Mexicano Peligran Frente a Maiz
Transginico: CECCAM, UDGTV (Apr. 26, 2019), http://udgtv.com/441ab/maiz-mexicano-peligrafrente-a-transgenico [https://perma.cc/N9B6-VUEC].
29.
See infra Section III.C; Pineyro-Nelson, supra note 1, at 96-97.
30.
See O' Leary, supra note 21; GAIN MX8050, supra note 2, at 6.
31.
See O' Leary, supra note 21; GAIN MX8050, supra note 2, at 6.
32.
See Ernesto Hern6ndez-L6pez, Law, Food, and Culture: Mexican Corn's National
Identity Cooked in "Tortilla Discourses" Post-TLC/NAFTA, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 670, 687-88
(2008).
33.
See 0' Leary, supra note 21; David Alire Garcia, Past and Future Collide as Mexico
Fights over GMO Corn, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2013, 2:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmexico-corn/past-and-future-collide-as-mexico-fights-over-gmo-corn-idUSBRE 9AB 1Q20131112
[https://perma.cc/FMT9-NUU4].
34.
In 2014, M6xico imported USD 3.3 billion from the United States. Brazil provided its
second largest source of corn imports with USD 33.3 million. M6xico is also the second-largest
destination for US corn exports, with Japan at only USD 100 million more. See Daniel Workman,
Corn Imports by Country, WORLD'S TOP EXPORTS (Apr. 1, 2019), http://www.worldstopexports.com/corn-imports-by-country [https://perma.cc/2VLE-KG5M]. Other GMO corn exporters to
M6xico include Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. GAIN MX8050, supra note 2, at 6.
35.
See Rojas-Barrera et al., supranote 9; Garcia, supra note 33.
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In M6xico, GMO corn products are legal, but planting GMO corn
is not legal. 36 GMO farming for other crops, like cotton, is legal. 37 But
any commercial planting of GMO corn requires permit approvals from
the secretary of agriculture, which have been suspended by court order
since 2013.38 Consequently, GMO corn is the subject of intricate legal

wrangling and public controversies. 39 In Colectividad del Maiz, the
plaintiff also sued M6xico's environmental agency and permit
applicants-the seed companies Monsanto, Dow, Pioneer-Dupont,
and Syngenta. 40 The Colectividad seeks to stop all commercial
planting of GMO corn, heavily relying on measures implementing
the precautionary principle.4 1 Based in international law, the
precautionary principle allows states to employ actions to stop
biosecurity or environmental harms, even in the absence of scientific
evidence of their negative impact. 42 The source of this principle is a
state's international sovereignty.
36.
See GAIN MX8050, supra note 2, at 4, 6.
37.
See id.
See id. at 4.
38.
39.
See, e.g., Ang6lica Enciso L., Falta al Pr6ximo Gobierno Decidir Sobre Transginicos,
JORNADA (July 13, 2018), https://www.jornada.com.mx/ultimas/politica/2018/07/13/falta-al-proximo-gobierno-decidir-sobre-transgenicos-3272.html
[https://perma.cc/L4K3-8TF2].
For
descriptions of M6xico's biotechnology regulations and different agency roles, see GAIN MX8050,
supra note 2, at 7-9. The secretary's prior name was the Secretariade Agricultura, Ganaderia,
DesarrolloRural, Pescay Alimentaci6n (SAGARPA). This was the name used for the better part
of the developments in this Article. Recently, the secretary changed its name to Secretaria de
Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural (SADER). Carolina G6mez Mena, Sagarpa Pasa a
Ser Sader, JORNADA (Dec. 3. 2018), https://www.jornada.com.mx/2018/12/03/politica/007nlpol
[https://perma.cc/8RG2-4BSJ]; Marco Campos, SAGARPA Changes Name to SADER, PRODUCE
BLUE BOOK (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.producebluebook.com/2019/02/15/sagarpa-changes-nameto-sader [https://perma.cc/ZL5D-64CM#modal]. For the policies described in this Article,
SAGARPA and SADER encompass the same authority, even though government documents and
sources may refer to different names. For the sake of simplicity, this Article refers to both SADER
and SAGARPA as the "secretary of agriculture."
40.
The complaint specifically listed the secretary of agriculture, secretary of the
environment and natural resources, and seed companies. Demanda Contra el Maiz Transgenico,
supra note 5. They are still identified as litigants. Enciso L., supra note 39. Since the lawsuit
began, there has been significant corporate consolidation of seed companies. Bayer merged with
Monsanto, ChemChina merged with Syngenta, and Corteva was created from the Dow and
Pioneer-Dupont merger. For simplicity, this Article uses the names most common in court
documents and news analyses in M6xico-that is, Monsanto, Dow, Pioneer-Dupont, and Syngenta.
For a description of these mergers, see infra note 148.
41.
See Enciso L., supra note 6.
42.
There are many international formulations of the principle. This Article refers to
the precautionary principle in the international law applied to biosafety, which includes
biotechnologies like GMOs. Specifically, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety adopts the
precautionary principle in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., Jan. 29,
2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, 39 I.L.M 1027 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol]. Principle 15 states,
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At initial glance, the lawsuit focuses on administrative
procedures and agriculture permits, but its ultimate result shapes
Mexican sovereign authority. Both sides point to different legal
doctrines to support dueling positions. The Colectividad argues that
there has been an unauthorized release of GMO corn, inconsistent with
M6xico's biosecurity regime, the Ley de Bioseguridad de Organismos
Geniticamente Modificados (LBOGM). 43 Courts agreed to suspend
permits for GMO corn while the legal dispute proceeds. The
precautionary principle incorporated in the LBOGM,44 the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),4 5 and the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety (the "Cartagena Protocol")4 6 support these suspensions.

Meanwhile, pro-GMO interest groups argue that the suspensions are
illegal. They contested the Colectividad's standing, the constitutionality
of demandas colectivas, and the legality of pretrial court orders.4 7 They
continue to make these arguments in the SCJN.4 8 In addition, the
LBOGM may protect seed companies and GMOs from permit
suspensions. A potential argument for seed companies is that the
LBOGM protects them from permit suspensions, since they have

"Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, princ. 15, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev/1 reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. For a description of the principle's history, its inclusion in
various international treaties, and its application by national legal systems, see DAVID HUNTER ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 478-84 (2015).

43.
Ley de Bioseguridad de Organismos Gen6ticamente Modificados [LBOGM],
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] 18-03-2005 (Mex.), http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LBOGM.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8X7-SMM2] [hereinafter LBOGM].
44.
See id. at art. 9.IV.
45.
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818
(entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD].
46.
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 42.
47.

See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN MX3087, MEXICAN JUDGE LIFTS INJUNCTION ON GE

CORN PERMITS (2013) [hereinafter GAIN MX3087]. For a description of how environmental-law
claims pose procedural complications for the new collective-action regime, see David P. Vincent,
Group Litigation Reaches Mexico: Revisiting Mexico's System of Collective Actions as a Vehicle to
Ensure Efficient Implementation of Environmental Justice, 5 MEx. L. REV. 401 (2013).
48.
Demanda
Colectiva
Maiz,
DIcimo
Segundo
Informe
Semestral,
FACEBOOK
(July
5,
2019),
https://www.facebook.com/ExpedienteMaiz/posts/2380235125567444?_xts_%5BO%5D=68.ARCIPh9pSx7F90VOoPsXGli3sxrL71IG9FhFf98IQbolA6 lGjUWmtydthscZY8ntXW2bNpfcX4KnARxhCS0eXgEyljDgMCxR5SaFNpF-vqgSMrkAQ3p
TJKvh7Fd-DzRXmqWgbe4MUJGbh9cdEA8t0NJVMqcHbgN6NnoaHzWOM7Qt58xAnjIsYyCXLGY6WhvylJjcqrGPIwEyGYgOOagY5kjeKQcrWM4WIUhjcstv8lQD2xkBxwgi5cPcXxHQDeprxocWPnYCOGZmMT4qK7vxjbDEnToWJjF9glzBGrsNOQQsX7gt6fkHjaG104Mtn48r86ypWPxNIWYTteeUNwMUUGvWe&_tn_=
K-R [https://perma.cc/J78V-2YXB].
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rights as intellectual property (IP) owners under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); 4 9 its expected revision,
the US-M6xico-Canada Agreement (USMCA); 5 0 and World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements.5 1
At first, Colectividad del Maiz appears to only affect
administrative procedures and agriculture permits, but the
Colectividad's focus on using courts to regulate GMO corn may shape
M6xico's sovereign authority. 52 This Article makes three arguments
about Mexican biodiversity protections: (1) current Mexican regulations
support GMO farming, prioritize economic interests, and discourage
GMO controls; (2) a demanda colectiva provides a means to employ
precautionary-principle measures to protect landrace corn; and (3) by
forcing a decision between biodiversity protections or approval of GMO
permits, such collective lawsuits can shape M6xico's sovereignty. To
support these arguments, this Article relies on the "critical legal" 53
perspective on international law and on "decolonial theory."54 These

49.
As described in Part III, international legal agreements may limit M6xico's option for
precaution. NAFTA protects investors from the United States and Canada from regulatory
measures amounting to expropriation. See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1110(1),
Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. [hereinafter NAFTA] (prohibiting government measures
that "indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment"). Additionally, NAFTA chapter 17
requires that M6xico provide a series of IP protections consistent with international treaties. See
id. art. 1701(2).
50.
See USMCA, Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [https://perma.cc/4VXG-H772], (December 13, 2019)
[hereinafter USMCA]. The USMCA is expected to be implemented in the future, but at the time of
this writing there is no "entry-into-force date." See U.S. -Mexico - CanadaAgreement (USMCA),
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/USMCA [https://perma.cc/S86Y-YH5C].
51.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has
been argued to provide protection for GMO corn seed companies in M6xico. See Kathleen McAfee,
Corn Culture and DangerousDNA: Real and Imagined Consequences of Maize Transgene Flow in
Oaxaca, 2 J. LATIN AM. GEOGRAPHY 18, 32-33 (2003).

52.
Food-system scholar Timothy Wise presents the "core" issues in the lawsuit as about
protecting corn's biodiversity. See WISE, supra note 10, at 178.
53.
These approaches focus on international environmental law and Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). For examinations of environmental law and the
North-South divide, see INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1-170

(Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2015). For descriptions of TWAIL, see Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja,
Beyond the (Post) Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of InternationalLaw, 45 L. & POL. APR.,
ASIA & LATIN AM. 195, 195 (2012); James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its
Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEv. 26, 26 (2011); Makau
Mutua, What Is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 31, 31-32 (2000).

For introductory descriptions of decolonial theory, see COLONIALITY AT LARGE: LATIN
2 (Mabel Moraila et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter
COLONIALITY AT LARGE]. Professors Anjali Vats and Deidr6 A. Keller explain the value of using
54.
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perspectives examine how economics, politics, and ideology shape
sovereign authority over biodiversity and foreign interests. Decolonial
theory emphasizes the influence of colonialism on postcolonial
economics, political authority, and belief systems-an effect which is
known as "coloniality."55
The GMO corn fight demonstrates how sovereignty may
be interpreted as a national right to protect biodiversity or as a
governmental justification for economic rights for foreign actors.
International, environmental, and demanda colectiva legal doctrines
frame this debate. While the fight is over M6xico's market for corn, the
ideological contest is over the safety of GMOs and M6xico's sovereign
authority to employ precautionary measures to protect biodiversity.
Analyzing this corn fight from a critical perspective, this Article
illustrates the shape sovereignty takes over biodiversity and foreign
economic interests.
This Article proceeds as follows. Focusing on economics, Part II
describes the critiques and justifications for GMO corn. Parts III and
IV present the laws and regulations governing GMO corn in M6xico.
Part III identifies the gaps in biosecurity regulations and the incentives
created for GMO farming that have allowed foreign companies to
become the most significant GMO actors in M6xico. Part IV describes
recent legal developments-namely, Colectividad del Maiz litigation
and changes in M6xico's GMO and biosecurity policies. Part V explains
how coloniality currently operates in M6xico. It describes what is at
stake in the resolution of Colectividad del Maiz: sovereignty will protect
either biodiversity or GMOs. 5 6 Coloniality helps identify the law's

decolonial theory to examine IP law. See Anjali Vats & Deidr6 A. Keller, Critical Race IP, 36
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 735, 736 (2018).
55.
This paraphrases coloniality's "matrix of power." See infra Section V.A. For the sake
of simplicity, this Article uses the term "coloniality" as a shorthand for the decolonial concept
of "coloniality of power." Coloniality operates with four domains over economics, authority,
patriarchy, and subjectivity and knowledge. For definitions of "coloniality" and its approach
examining economics, authority, patriarchy, and belief systems, see COLONIALITY AT LARGE, supra
note 54, at 2, 6 n.11; Walter D. Mignolo, Introduction: Coloniality of Power and De-Colonial
Thinking, 21 CULTURAL STUD. 155, 155 (2007).
56.
This Article provides a description of recent GMO corn developments and M6xico's
biosecurity framework and an examination of how these two issues help shape M6xico's
sovereignty. This Article does not attempt to analyze all of the relevant law in the Colectividad del
Maiz dispute-that is, the agency determinations, litigation developments, or constitutional law
inquiries. Instead, it provides the legal and biotechnology contexts relevant to explain the
significance of GMO corn debates. When the dispute ends, a more detailed examination of the legal
doctrine would be possible. This Article refers to a great deal of scholarship from a variety of
scientific disciplines, and from the science and technology studies field, by noting their conclusions
without questioning their methods or findings.
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normative role in framing the corn fight.5 7 Part VI contextualizes the
economics and ideological contests implicit in Colectividad del Maiz.
II. A GENE REVOLUTION CULTIVATES FEARS FOR
BIODIVERSITY AND CORN

Conceptual and scientific innovations in biotechnologies
produced GMOs. During the second half of the last century, a "green
revolution"5 8 increased agricultural productivity, especially in the
Global South, with farms benefitting from research, business
organization, and industrial technology.5 9 After the green revolution
came a "gene revolution"-the introduction of GMOs.60 A GMO is
created when the genetic material of one organism is inserted into
another organism to add desirable traits to a crop, such as pest
resistance or herbicide resistance. 61 GMO technologies are referred to
by different names in English and in Spanish. 62 GMOs are just one set
of biotechnology techniques used to change the cellular makeup of
organisms. 63 GMO techniques differ from plant breeding, since the
latter focuses on the whole plant, while GMOs isolate genetic material
to alter plant growth.
GMO technologies were developed in the 1980s and have been
made available commercially since the 1990s, but they vary in

57.
For introductory descriptions of coloniality and decolonial theory, see COLONIALITY
AT LARGE, supra note 54; Mignolo, supra note 55; Anibal Quijano, Coloniality and
Modernity/Rationality, 21 CULTURAL STUD. 168, 170 (2007).
58.
Environmental and socioeconomic worries about a gene revolution have existed for
decades. See, e.g., Albert Gore, Jr., The Gene Revolution, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND FOOD SUPPLY:
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 3 (1988); Erwin Northoff, The Gene Revolution: GreatPotential for
the Poor, but No Panacea, FAO NEWSROOM (May 17, 2004), http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2004/41714/index.html [https://perma.cc/URQ%-AXDV].
59.
The green revolution, which came after the mechanical revolution, chemical
revolution, and hybrid revolution, helped farmers with mechanization, land conditions, and seed
development, respectively. In the second half of the twentieth century, the green revolution
brought these developments to "less developed" countries, with M6xico first and then Asia. See
FELICIA WU & WILLIAM BUTZ, THE FUTURE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 3 (2004).

60.
Environmental anthropologist Glenn Davis Stone explains that the terms "genetic
modification" and "genetic engineering" refer to the same thing, "transgenic" also refers to GMOs,
and "recombinant DNA" is the original and most exact term. See Glenn Davis Stone, The
Anthropology of Genetically Modified Crops, 39 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 381, 382 n.1 (2010).
61.
See Rachel Schurman, Introduction to ENGINEERING TROUBLE 4 (Rachel A. Schurman
& Dennis Takahashi Kelso eds., 2003).
62.
In English, GMO technology is also called "genetically engineered," "transgenic," or
'recombinant" DNA; it can be abbreviated as "GM" or "GE." See, e.g., FITTING supra note 11, at 29
(describing some of these techniques). In Spanish, GMOs are referred to as transginico,organismo
geniticamente modificado, or organismo modificado geniticamente.
63.
See Stone, supra note 60, at 381-82.
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popularity across the globe.6 4 The United States leads the world in area
devoted to GMO planting, and, along with Brazil, Argentina, Canada,
and India, accounts for over 90 percent of GMO planting. 65 Many GMO
crops are grown commercially, including soybeans, corn, cotton, and
canola. 66 One example of GMO corn is Bt corn. 67 In Bt corn, genes from
the bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) are inserted into the corn
genome, which allow the corn plant to produce a protein that selectively
kills insect pests for corn plants, like the corn borer. 68
Governments exercise their sovereign authority to develop GMO
policies. Whether GMO consumption is harmful to humans is an open
question that government regulators must address. 69 US food-safety
and biosecurity regulators generally find that GMOs are substantially
equal to traditional plants.70 Many scientific studies conclude that

64.
Glenn Davis Stone provides a quick history, from early DNA mapping in 1953, to
isolating genes in the 1970s, to first commercializing GMO crops in China in 1988 and in the
United States in 1994. See id. at 382. GMO corn has been grown commercially since 1996. See
Mauricio R. Bellon & Julien Berthaud, Traditional Mexican Agricultural Systems and the
PotentialImpacts of TransgenicVarieties on Maize Diversity, 23 AGRIC. & HUM.VALUES 3, 3 (2006).
For a description of Bt early development, see William Boyd, Wonderful Potencies?Deep Structure
and the Problem ofMonopoly in Biotechnology, in ENGINEERING TROUBLE 33 (Rachel A. Schurman
& Dennis Takahashi Kelso eds., 2003).
65.
See Glenn Davis Stone, Genetically Modified Organisms, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANTHROPOLOGY 2603, 2603 (2018).

66.
Stone, supra note 60, at 382.
67.
Elizabeth Fitting, Importing Corn, Exporting Labor: The Neoliberal Corn Regime,
GMOs and the Erosion ofMexican Biodiversity, 23 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 15, 17 (2006).
68.
See id.
69.
See id.
70.
For an analysis of how the principle of substantial equivalence frames US
GMO regulation, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, Trail Smelter's (Semi)Precautionary Legacy, in
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 160 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller

eds., 2006); Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating
GeneticallyModified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 393, 405-14 (2007).
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GMOs are safe for consumption,7 1 but many do not.72 Some studies
argue that GMO corn is not substantially equivalent to landrace corn. 7 3
In light of the scientific disagreement, two generally competing
perspectives on how to regulate GMOs have developed: substantial
equivalence7 4 and precautionary principle .7 The precautionary
principle supports a state's prohibition on an activity even if scientific
evidence is inconclusive or incomplete.7 6 The precautionary principle
functions as a government choice, sourced in sovereignty, to respond
to GMO harms. Professor Rebecca Bratspies explains that the
precautionary principle, which developed in response to the substantial
equivalence approach of US regulators, provides states a means to
prevent harms.77 The principle has a long history of inclusion in

71.
An example of the pro-GMO positions is in a comprehensive report from National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine published in 2016. Its key findings on
human health, the environment, and agriculture are summarized. See Genetically Engineered
Crops: Experiences and Prospects-New Report, NAT'L ACADS. SCI., ENG'G, & MED.: NEWS
(May 17, 2016), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordlD=23395
[https://perma.cc/QES8-EHYK]. For a website describing the contents of the report, created by the
National Academies, see Genetically EngineeredCrops: Experiences and Prospects, NAT'L ACADS.
SCI., ENG'G, & MED., http://nas-sites.org/ge-crops/ [https://perma.cc/2968-5YWA] (last visited Aug.
8, 2019). The full report is NAT'L ACADS. OF SCI., EN'G, & MED., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS:

&

EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS (2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23395/genetically-engineeredcrops-experiences-and-prospects [https://perma.cc/KH47-E4W5].
72.
For a brief summary of the position that there is no scientific consensus on GMO
safety, signedby over three hundred scientists, see Angelika Hilbeck et al., No Scientific Consensus
on GMO Safety, 27 ENVTL. SCI. EUR. (2015). Toxicologist Jos6 Domingo provides periodic reviews
of scholarly literature to argue there is no consensus on the safety of GMOs. See Jos6 L. Domingo,
Safety Assessment of GM Plants: An Updated Review of the Scientific Literature, 95 FOOD
CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 12 (2016); Jos6 L. Domingo & Jordi Gin6 Bordonaba, A Literature Review
on the Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants, 37 ENVTL. INT'L 734 (2011).
See Robin Mesnage et al., An Integrated Multi-Omics Analysis of the NK603
73.
Roundup-Tolerant GM Maize Reveals Metabolism Disturbances Caused by the Transformation
Process, 6 SCI. REP., no. 37855, Dec. 19, 2016, https://www.nature.com/articles/srep37855
[https://perma.cc/HV6C-PJ7K].
74.
Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating Genetically
Modified Organisms, supra note 70, at 406.
75.
Professor Keith Aoki contrasts US reliance on substantial equivalence with a
European focus on precautionary principles. See Keith Aoki, Seeds ofDispute: Intellectual-Property
Rights and AgriculturalBiodiversity, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 146 (2009).
76.
After comparing a series of international agreements and protocols, Professor John S.
Applegate reports on four elements in the many variations of the precautionary principle. They
regard the triggering by harms, the timing between trigger and response, a state's regulatory
response, and how to address uncertainty. See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary
Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 17-20 (2002).
77.
See generally Bratspies, Trail Smelter's (Semi)PrecautionaryLegacy, supra note 70.
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environmental and biosecurity treaties in international law.78 Professor
John S. Applegate describes the CBD in 1992 as a "turning point" for
the principle.79 Since then, domestic courts in Canada, France, India,
and Panama have referred to the principle.8 0 As the primary treaty
addressing biosafety and biodiversity, the Cartagena Protocol
in various instances refers to the precautionary principle.8 1 The
precautionary principle is often presented as the European
perspective. 82 Historically, the United States has opposed the
precautionary principle. 83 During negotiations for the Cartagena
Protocol, the United States and Australia opposed the precautionary
principle while various developing countries called for its inclusion.8 4
The United States typically favors the substantial equivalence
approach, which attempts to craft regulations based on risks that can
be quantified.85 Substantial equivalence requires proof that the risks
can be quantified prior to implementing regulation.8 6 Consequently,
precautionary measures are rare with substantial equivalence.8 7
Practically speaking, judges, regulators, and policy makers examine
scientific proof of the harm. Whether to regulate a potentially useful
technology in light of unknown risks animates the dynamic between
the two approaches, precautionary principle and substantial
equivalence. While precautionary-principle supporters generally worry
about environmental or safety harms, substantial-equivalence
78.

See David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary

Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 12-13 (David Freestone

& Ellen Hey eds., 1996); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 42, at 483.
79.
Applegate, supra note 76, at 23-24.
80.
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 42, at 483-84.
81.
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 42, pmbl. (referring to principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development), art. 15, ¶ 1 (providing guidelines for risk), art.
10, ¶ 2 (providing decision-making procedures), annex III, ¶¶ 4-6 (describing risk evaluations).
For a description of the protocol, see the discussion accompanying infra note 156.
82.
See Bratspies, Trail Smelter's (Semi)PrecautionaryLegacy, supranote 70, at 159, 159
n.37.
83.
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 42, at 479.
84.
See Harmut Meyer, The PrecautionaryPrinciple and the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety: Development of a Concept, in BIOSAFETY FIRST 3-5 (Terje Traavik & Li Ching Lim eds.,
2007).
85.
For a concise description of US approaches to GMO, including regulations,
jurisprudence on patents, and current restrictions, see Luis Acosta, Restrictions on
Genetically Modified Organisms: United States, L. LIBR. OF CONGRESS (June 9,
2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php [https://perma.cc/5W9C-KU85].
Rebecca Bratspies describes the weaknesses in the US approach to GMO regulation. See Rebecca
M. Bratspies, Is Anyone Regulating? The Curious State of GMO Governance in the United States,
37 VT. L. REV. 923, 924 (2013).
86.
See Bratspies, Trail Smelter's (Semi)PrecautionaryLegacy, supra note 70, at 159-60.
87.
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 42, at 480.
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proponents view the principle as halting progress and relying on
irrational decisions.8 8
There are many arguments in support of GMO agriculture,8 9 and
some have ceaselessly called for the cultivation of GMO corn in M6xico
since GMO corn was first developed.90 Scientific studies doubt that
GMO transgenes, from GMO corn, spread to corn landrace plants and
repeatedly find that GMO corn increases productivity.9 1 GMO corn
generally makes the sowing, maintaining, irrigating, and harvesting
processes easier and produces larger and more predictable yields.
Furthermore, because the plant can defend itself from pests and is
tolerant of herbicides, less labor is needed. 92 Ultimately, this can make
growing GMO crops more profitable than the traditional growing of
non-GMO crops. All of these benefits have led some to herald GMOs as
the key to achieving food sufficiency and combatting food insecurity.
Critics argue that there is no scientific consensus that GMOs are
safe 93 and that claimed advantages from GMOs are overstated or
untrue.9 4 Environmental anthropologist Glenn Davis Stone explains
88.
Professor Alessandra Arcuri describes this debate and emphasizes that critics often
focus on extreme and inaccurate versions of the principle and have myopic faith in science. She
argues that critics misplace their focus and should instead view the precautionary principle as
an opportunity to improve the understanding of science by regulators. See Alessandra Arcuri,
ReconstructingPrecaution,DeconstructingMisconceptions,21 ETHICS & INT'LAFF. 359, 359 (2007).
89.
See Stone, supra note 60, at 383.
90.
See, e.g., Oscar Steve, Mixico Se Estd Quedando Atrds en Transginicos Segun
Cinvestav, Aunque AMLO Ha Anunciado su Rechazo Total a Ellos, XATAKA (Mar. 12,
2019),
https://www.xataka.com.mx/investigacion/mexico-se-esta-quedando-atras-transgenicoscinvestav-amlo-ha-anunciado-su-rechazo-total-a-ellos [https://perma.cc/P5VX-6KWP] (criticizing
the government's limiting of GMO research support); Monsanto Aclara: Biotecnologia Se
Utiliza de Forma Segura, EXCELSIOR (June 21, 2019), https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/monsanto-aclara-biotecnologia-se-utiliza-de-forma-segura/1320031
[https://perma.cc/K4J8-X9SV]
(summarizing Monsanto's arguments that GMO farming can be safe and fair to farmers); Lorena
Gonz6lez Guzm6n, Con Biotecnologia, Productividad de Maiz Nacional Subiria Hasta 22%,
ANGULO 7 (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.angulo7.com.mx/2017/10/25/biotecnologia-productividadmaiz-nacional-subiria-22/ [https://perma.cc/F9U5-Q5M4] (describing a study on the national
economic benefits of GMO corn in M6xico).
91.
See Elisa Pellegrino et al., Impact of Genetically Engineered Maize on Agronomic,
Environmental and Toxicological Traits: A Meta-Analysis of 21 Years of Field Data, 8
SCI. REPS., no. 3113, Feb. 15, 2018, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-21284-2
[https://perma.cc/GH9X-ALCU]; Sol Ortiz-Garcia et al., Transgenic Maize in Mexico, 56
BIoSCIENCE 709 (2006).

92.
See Timothy Wise, High Risks, Few Rewards for Mexico with Monsanto's Maize, AL
JAZEERA: OPINION (May 27, 2014), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/mexicomonsanto-maize-gmo-2014526114154374563.html [https://perma.cc/KCD2-N5HJ].
See Hilbeck et al., supra note 72.
93.
94.

See DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FAILURE TO YIELD:

EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS (2009). Non-GMO corn is

argued to produce enough corn for M6xico and could offset import dependency, if it had public
support. See Fern6ndez, Wise & Garvey, supra note 24.
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that some evidence suggests that increases in crop yields claimed to be
caused by GMOs in the United States and India may be exaggerated,
since increases in productivity may be caused by other factors.9 5 He
adds that GMO crops have resulted in increased use of glyphosate
because weeds have become resistant to the herbicide.9 6
Scientific studies also point to a variety of negative impacts from
GMO farming. Research shows that pests build a resistance to toxins in
GMO corn9 7 and other GMO crops. 9 8 Moreover, GMO crops have been

found to have negative impacts on nontarget species, which refers to
animals other than the targeted pests.9 9 GMO plant scientists argue
that GMO seeds, including corn, do not provide the purported benefits
for GMO farming, given the cost of GMO seeds, their environmental
impacts, and the demands created by irrigation and needed record
keeping. 100
Law plays a central role in GMO debates. Legal doctrines find
GMOs to be safe and support their increased use, while ignoring the
biodiversity or socioeconomic harms they create. Basically, GMOs
are protected by enforceable property rights under either IP or
international trade regimes. In general, not just in M6xico, seed
companies depend on IP and contract-law regimes for GMO
technologies to succeed. 101 This began with US Supreme Court decisions
and legislation in the 1980s and 1990s that provided the legal basis for
GMO technology to benefit from patent protection. 102
95.
Stone, supra note 65.
Id.
96.
97.
See Aaron J. Gassmann et al., Field-Evolved Resistance by Western Corn Rootworm to
Multiple Bacillus thuringiensis Toxins in TransgenicMaize, 111 PNAS 5141, 5141 (2014); Andreas
Lang & Eva Vojtech, The Effects of Pollen Consumption of Transgenic Bt Maize on the Common
Swallowtail, Papilio machaon L. (Lepidoptera, Papilionidae), 7 BAsIC & APPLIED ECOLOGY 296,
296 (2006).
98.
Anthony D. Burd et al., Estimated Frequency of Nonrecessive Bt Resistance Genes in
Bollworm, Helicoverpa zea (Boddie) (Lepidotera: Noctuidae) in Eastern North Carolina, 96 J.
ECON. ENTOMOLOGY 137, 137 (2003); Jian-Zhou Zhao et al., Different Cross-ResistancePatterns in
the DiamondbackMoth (Lepidoptera:Plutellidae)Resistant to Bacillus thuringiensis Toxin CrylC,
94 J. ECON. ENTOMOLOGY 1547, 1547 (2001).

99.
See Michelle Marvier et al., A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Bt Cotton and Maize on
NontargetInvertebrates,316 SCIENCE 1475 (2007); A. Hilbeck & J.E.U. Schmidt, Another View on
Bt Proteins - How Specific Are They and What Else Might They Do?, 2 BIOPESTICIDES INT'L 1
(2006).
100.
See G.C. R6tolo et al., Time to Re-Think the GMO Revolution in Agriculture, 26
ECOLOGICAL INFORMATICS 35, 35 (2015).

101.
For a description of the history of the evolution of IP rights since the 1980s in the
United States, the permitting of patent protections for living organisms, the placing of license
limits on farmers, and IP rights' significance to the biotechnology industry, see Boyd, supra note
64, at 36-48.
102.
Stone, supra note 60, at 385.
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Even though there are many criticisms of GMO crops, this
Article focuses on criticisms arising from business interests,
biodiversity perspectives, and corn-specific reasons. 103 A major business
complaint of GMOs comes from the practice of single-use seeds. For
GMO crops, growers must use seeds that are bought with a license,
which often requires them to be used for only one year. The grower
cannot store or save the seeds. Agrochemical companies, like Monsanto,
Dow, Pioneer-Dupont, and Syngenta, place these limits for many
reasons, including to protect their intellectual property; maintain
uniform planting conditions; and ensure compliance with the needed
inputs, like fertilizer, irrigation, pesticides, and herbicides. GMO
farming only succeeds as monocrop agriculture-in other words, when
only one crop is grown on a farm.
In M6xico, farmers have many complaints about seed licenses
and single-use requirements. 104 They worry that national regulations
do not include a provision for unintentional breach of patent license.1 05
Traditionally, Mexican farmers save leftover seeds for plants with
desirable traits. Because farmers can only license GMO seeds, they lose
the flexibility to save those leftover. There is significant legal liability
for saving seeds, and seed companies utilize aggressive legal strategies
to ensure compliance. In 2002, there were criminal penalties for storing
GMO seeds, which created additional fear. 106 Another business
complaint is that GMO farming is expensive, with high costs spent on
the actual seeds, required inputs like herbicides, large amounts of
water, and needed mechanization.
In M6xico, corn farmers often avoid GMO corn for these
reasons. 107 Doctor Alma Pifieyro-Nelson explains that corn farms in
M6xico are generally small parcels and grow many crops with few
chemical inputs, while in the United States GMO corn relies on
monocrop farms, large plots, extensive mechanization, petrochemical
fertilizers, and pesticides, and thus has more water needs. 108 This is
problematic since it necessitates large-scale planting, which may be

103.
Emphasizing geography, seed reuse, seed flows, and seed mixing, researchers
Mauricio Bellon and Julien Berthaud explain how corn farmers in M6xico are susceptible to GMO
contamination. See Bellon & Berthaud, supra note 64, at 5-7.
104.
Pineyro-Nelson, supra note 1, at 97; Stone, supra note 60, at 384.
105.
Pineyro-Nelson, supra note 1, at 97.
106.
See Aarti Gupta & Robert Falkner, The Influence of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety: ComparingMexico, China, and South Africa, 6 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 23, 34 (2006).
107.
Fern6ndez, Wise & Garvey, supra note 24, at 8.
108.
Pineyro-Nelson, supra note 1, at 96.
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impossible given terrain limitations or land costs in M6xico. 109
Monocrop farming is susceptible to higher risks since only one kind of
plant is grown and any infestation or other negative condition can
impact the whole harvest. 110 Growing only one crop over a sustained
period also depletes the soil of nutrients.
In the past few years, policy makers and courts have found
harms with GMO farming because of the toxic effects of needed inputs
for this kind of farming. Usually these are from herbicides. The most
common example is glyphosate, which is sold by Monsanto as the
product RoundUp.11 1 Monsanto sells GMO seeds as "RoundUp Ready."
Since GMO seeds are engineered to withstand these chemicals,
herbicides are needed and are heavily used to attain GMO farming's
full productivity. Studies point to problems from glyphosate use in
farming. Weeds build a resistance to the herbicide, and farms must
increasingly use more glyphosate. 112 The resulting "superweeds" pose
larger environmental problems. 113 These harms, along with many more,
motivate scientists to increasingly explain that there is no consensus on
the safe use for glyphosate -based herbicides.11 4
Recent court verdicts against Monsanto because of the
herbicides' toxic impact on humans have brought the glyphosate
controversies to public light.11 5 Previously, the International Agency for
109.
See id. at 96-97 (elaborating the industrial agricultural scheme of larger regions like
the United States and its incompatibility with the smaller, diversified systems commonly found in
M6xico).
110.
See id. at 96 (defining monocrop farming).
111.
For a description of glyphosate's history, increased usage, and the law's role in
stimulating consequential debates between regulators and policy makers, see Alessandra Arcuri,
Glyphosate, in INTERNATIONAL LAW'S OBJECTS 234 (Jessie Hohmann & Daniel Joyce eds., 2018).
112.
See Charles M. Benbrook, Impacts of Genetically EngineeredCrops on Pesticide Use in
the U.S. - The First Sixteen Years, 24 ENVTL. SCI. EUR. 24, 24 (2012) ("Moreover, the impacts of
these traits on U.S. pesticide use trends are substantial and obvious, especially in recent years as
a result of the growing number and geographical spread of glyphosate-resistant (GR) weeds.");
Stephen B. Powles, Evolved Glyphosate-Resistant Weeds Around the World: Lessons to be Learnt,
64 PEST MGMT. SCI. 360, 360 (2008).
113.
See Carmen Bain et al., 'Superweeds' or 'Survivors'? Framing the Problem of
Glyphosate-ResistantWeeds and Genetically EngineeredCrops, 51 J. RURAL STUD. 211, 219 (2017)
("In the current context, farmers are compelled to implement more environmentally harmful
on-farm practices to kill resistant weeds, such as increased tillage and the use of more toxic
herbicides.").
114.
See John Peterson Myers et al., Concerns over Use of Glyphosate-BasedHerbicidesand
Risks Associated with Exposures: A Consensus Statement, 15 ENVTL. HEALTH 5, 5 (2016) (detailing
the "profound gaps in estimates of worldwide human [glyphosate-based herbicide] exposure" and
the according regulatory "uncertaint[y] regarding both [glyphosate-based herbicide] safety and
exposure").
115.
See Patricia Cohen, $2 Billion Verdict Against Monsanto Is Third to Find Roundup
Caused Cancer, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/business/monsanto-roundup-cancer-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/PX5B-FVRW]. Monsanto and others have
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Research on Cancer of the UN World Health Organization found
glyphosate to be probably carcinogenic.

116

Its toxicity has been found to

spread to humans who consume GMO products.1 17 Furthermore,
Pifieyro-Nelson links consumption of GMO corn to dangers for embryo
development based on an accumulation within the human body.118
GMOs also raise concerns related to biodiversity.1 19 A study
conducted between 2002 and 2007 confirms that there has been a
loss of genetic diversity in corn landraces throughout M6xico because
of GMOs. 120 Previously, this had been undetected because of
methodological biases in prior research. 12 1 This is consistent with prior
studies on corn in M6xico finding irreversible impacts with GMO
transgenes on landrace corn1 22 and finding GMO farming management
practices insufficient to protect landraces. 123

been critical of these rulings and the scientists courts relied on. See Michael Hiltzik, Did a
Jury Ignore Science when It Hit Monsanto with a $2-Billion Verdict?, L.A. TIMES (May
17, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-monsanto-glyphosate-verdict20190517-story.html [https://perma.cc/8QPB-8HN8].
116.
Daniel Cressey, Widely Used Herbicide Linked to Cancer, NATURE (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://www.nature.com/news/widely-used-herbicide-linked-to-cancer-1.17181
[https://perma.cc/XNX5-G4VS]. When published, this study created much attention, controversy,
and criticism from Monsanto and others. Id. For the International Agency for Research on Cancer
study, see Kathryn Z. Guyton et al., Carcinogenicityof Tetrachlorvinphos,Parathion,Malathion,
Diazinon, and Glyphosate, 16 LANCET ONCOLOGY 490 (2015).
117.
See ZEN HONEYCUTT & HENRY ROWLANDS, MOMS ACROSS AMERICA & SUSTAINABLE
PULSE, GLYPHOSATE TESTING REPORT: FINDINGS IN AMERICAN MOTHERS' BREAST MILK,

URINE AND WATER (2014), https://www.momsacrossamerica.com/glyphosatetesting-results
[https://perma.cc/A7WS-27MG]; Anthony Samsel & Stephanie Seneff, Glyphosate's Suppression of
Cytochrome P450 Enzymes and Amino Acid Biosynthesis by the Gut Microbiome: Pathways to
Modern Diseases, 15 ENTROPY 1416, 1441 (2013).
See Pineyro-Nelson, supra note 1, at 98.
118.
119.
For a description of the diversity of Mexican corn races, their evolution and
maintenance by humans, and their agricultural benefit, see Bellon & Berthaud, supra note 64, at
4-5. Professor Kathleen McAfee summarizes many of the negative impacts on biodiversity for
GMO corn in M6xico, including "transfer of genetic capacities" from GMO crops, those crops
"out-compet[ing] and displac[ing]" non-GMO crops, loss of unique landrace genetic traits,
transgenes traveling further than claimed, harm to useful predators like butterflies, and damage
to soil microbes. McAfee, supra note 51, at 20-2 1; see also Fern6ndez, Wise & Garvey, supranote
24, at 22.
120.
George A. Dyer et al., Genetic Erosion in Maize's Center of Origin, 111 PNAS 14094,
14094 (2014).
121.
See id.
122.
Antonio Turrent-Fern6ndez et al., Propuestade Cotejo de Impacto de la Acumulaci6n
de Transgenes en el Maiz (Zea mays L.) Nativo Mexicano fEvaluation Proposal of Possible Impact
of TransgeneAccumulation in Mexican Maize Landraces], 43 AGROCIENCIA 257, 258 (2009).
123.
See Daniela Soleri & David Cleveland, Transgenic Maize and Mexican Maize
Diversity: Risky Synergy?, 23 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 27, 28 (2006).
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GMO corn pollen can travel easily and unintentionally for as far
as one or two miles away. 124 Pollen is typically carried by wind or
insects. Corn is an open-air pollinating crop, making it easily
susceptible to DNA mixing with GMO corn. 125 GMO growers try to
contain any genetic spread by ensuring that their plots are not
surrounded by crops that can be contaminated. Independent of open-air
pollen, GMO plant genomes can mix with landrace plants during
transport as well. 126
Limiting where GMO crops are physically planted and what
flora surrounds them, these controls are strictly implemented and
monitored during the experimental and pilot phases of regulatory
approval. But during the commercial phase, controls are less rigorous.
Seed companies have said that they cannot control where seed grains
travel or end up, which adds to the call for precaution for GMO corn. 127
The concern for biodiversity is that corn GMO genomes definitely
interact with landrace corn. 128 Because landrace corn plants can be
altered with such ease, it is feared that their genetic traits-which may
help them adapt to drought, climate, terrain, and soil change-will be
lost. 129
In M6xico, the scientific community and the general public
became deeply attuned to these issues after an unauthorized release of
GMO corn in 2001 caused significant public controversy. 130 At that time,
GMO corn seeds were not approved in the country.131 M6xico had a de

&

124.
For a description of how corn's open pollination makes it vulnerable to transgenes, see
Pineyro-Nelson et al., supra note 14, at 751.
125.
See ANTAL ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Fern6ndez, Wise & Garvey, supra note 24,
at 22.
126.
Pineyro-Nelson, supra note 1, at 97; cf Rojas-Barrera et al., supra note 9, at 21302.
127.
Timothy A. Wise, Mexico and Monsanto: Taking Precaution in the Face of Genetic
Contamination, FOODTANK (May 21, 2014), https://foodtank.com/news/2014/05/mexico-history-ofgm-contamination) [https://perma.cc/R28D-KDG7]; Timothy A. Wise, Monsanto Meets Its Match in
the Birthplace ofMaize, TRIPLE CRISIS (May 12, 2014), http://triplecrisis.com/monsanto-meets-itsmatch-in-the-birthplace-of-maize [https://perma.cc/6R2S-DKLE].
128.
See Fern6ndez, Wise & Garvey, supra note 24, at 22.
129.
Id.
130.
Since the 1970s, scientists had warned that Mexican landrace genomes were
vulnerable. See Christophe Bonneuil, Jean Foyer & Brian Wynne, Genetic Fallout in Bio-Cultural
Landscapes:Molecular Imperialismand the CulturalPoliticsof (Not) Seeing Transgenes in Mexico,
44 Soc. STUD. SCI. 901, 907 (2014).
131.
Laura Vargas-Parada, GM Maize Splits Mexico, NATURE (July 1, 2014),
https://www.nature.com/news/gm-maize-splits-mexico- 1.15493
[https://perma.cc/L3BM-UERU].
Pro-GMO interests tried to persuade agriculture authorities against the moratorium. These efforts
benefitted from publication in prestigious international journals, while justifications for the
moratorium did not. See Bonneuil, Foyer & Wynne, supra note 130, at 907-08. For a summary of
the moratorium, how it complied with CBD objectives, and its elimination, see Lizy Peralta
Catherine Marielle, La Protecci6n Oficial del Maiz Frente los Transginicos: Una Simulaci6n de
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facto moratorium, refusing to approve any experimental cultivation of
GMO corn due to fear of open pollination. 132 That year, the prestigious
journal Nature published findings from UC Berkeley scientists Ignacio
Chapela and David Quist that corn landraces in Oaxaca contained
evidences of genetic material from GMO corn. 133 It is expected
that someone brought seeds to Oaxaca and landraces were then
penetrated by proteins that only came from GMO corn. This sparked
enormous controversy in M6xico.

1 34

The government appeared unaware

or negligent, claiming there was no genetic mixing. Experts in
biotechnology and related fields refuted the conclusions, arguing that
the tests were insufficient. 135 After this, Nature discounted the findings
from 2001, claiming that the scientific tests were not consistent with its
standards. 136 The whole experience left many doubting that scientific
experts or regulators would objectively listen to any criticisms of
GMOs. 137
In response, Mexican nongovernmental organizations sought
impartial and objective examination from the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a multilateral entity created by
NAFTA. 138 In 2004, the CEC issued an extensive report on GMO corn
and biodiversity confirming many of the findings from Chapela and
Quist. 1 39 Moreover, the report examined risks to genetic diversity,
impacts on natural ecosystems, health effects, and social and cultural
effects. 140 As an independent entity, the CEC's position only added to
Estado, in EL MAfZ EN PELIGRO ANTE LOS TRANSGtNICOS 441-44 (Elena Alvarez-Buylla & Alma

Pineyro-Nelson eds., 2013).
132.
GUTItRREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 59.
133.
David Quist & Ignacio H. Chapela, Transgenic DNA Introgressed into Traditional
Maize Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 NATURE 541, 541 (2001).
134.
Bonneuil, Foyer & Wynne, supra note 130, at 908. For a description of the controversy
in M6xico-in the journal, with Chapela and Quist's own colleagues, and for the biotechnology
field, see McAfee, supra note 51, at 23-24. The controversy also exemplifies how DNA-centered
analysis marginalizes perspectives emphasizing bioculture, gene flow, and biodiversity. See
Bonneuil, Foyer & Wynne, supranote 130, at 917-18.
135.
See Kathleen McAfee, Beyond Techno-Science: Transgenic Maize in the Fight over
Mexico's Future, 39 GEOFORUM 148, 154 (2008).
136.
EditorialNote, 416 NATURE 602, 602 (2002).
137.
See Kenneth Worthy, Richard C. Strohman & Paul R. Billings, Correspondence:
Conflicts Around a Study of Mexican Crops, 417 NATURE 897, 897 (June 27, 2002). For an example
of the competing debates about how to detect transgenes that occurred after the 2001 controversy,
see A. Pineyro-Nelson et al., Resolution of the Mexican Transgene Detection Controversy: Error
Sources and Scientific Practicein Commercial and Ecological Contexts, 18 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY
4145, 4145 (2009).
138.
See McAfee, supra note 135, at 149.
139.

COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION,

MAIZE AND BIODIVERSITY: THE EFFECTS OF

TRANSGENIC MAIZE IN MEXICO 15 (2004).
140.
For specifies of report, see McAfee, supra note 135, at 149, 152.
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the concerns of GMO skeptics. M6xico has been criticized for quickly
passing GMO regulations, specifically the LBOGM in 2005, 141 to avoid
implementing the CEC's recommendations for precautionary
measures. 142
What ensued, and continues, is debate about the scientific
support for these claims, including the quality of research methods,
purported evidence, and actual consensus about GMO safety. Seeking
peer-reviewed international journal attention, scientists from M6xico
and the United States published articles confirming or refuting
the GMO presence, years after Chapela and Quist's findings. 143 In
2004, Pifieyro-Nelson and others confirmed that transgenes were
present in the locations Chapela and Quist initially reported on.14 4 They
emphasized that different molecular and sampling methodologies can
lead to contrasting detection results. 145
Doubts persist in M6xico about whether agrochemical and
biotechnology fields will ever acknowledge proof that GMO corn alters
landrace genomes. Historian Christophe Bonneuil describes how the
methodologies and lab focus of the fields overlook evidence that
landrace genomes could be transgressed.14 6 Moreover, scientists debate
whether the socioeconomic and cultural effects of GMO corn should be
examined. The CEC report noted the significance of these factors in
addition to biodiversity impacts.14 7
Mexican criticism of GMO corn persists and has become more
pervasive. Out of this context, GMO corn litigation began in 2013. The
Colectividad del Maiz case centers on the impacts to biodiversity from
GMO corn. But, as described, there are many other criticisms of GMO
corn.
This Article builds on the criticism that foreign companies
produce GMO corn seeds. As described in Parts IV and V, these foreign
interests greatly influence M6xico's options for biodiversity regulation.
The Colectividad sued foreign-owned seed companies Monsanto, Dow,
Pioneer-Dupont, and Syngenta, which are regarded as US, German,
Swiss, or Chinese companies.1 4 8 With the companies setting the terms

141.
For how the LBOGM regulates GMOs, see infra Sections III.A and III.B.
142.
See WISE, supranote 127.
143.
See Bonneuil, Foyer & Wynne, supra note 130, at 909.
144.
See Pineyro-Nelson et al., supra note 14, at 750.
145.
See id.
146.
See Bonneuil, Foyer & Wynne, supra note 130, at 912.
147.
See McAfee, supra note 135, at 155 (reporting on scientific studies published from 2005
to 2006).
148.
This Article uses these company names since they are the most common references
in court documents and in the news. But, recently Monsanto, Dow, Pioneer-Dupont,

2020]

GMO CORN, MIXICO, AND COLONIALITY

747

of seed use, requiring toxic inputs, and determining what scientific
evidence can detect biodiversity harms, GMO corn is viewed with a high
degree of suspicion in M6xico. There is much criticism of how, on the
global stage, such a small number of corporations own GMO technology,
set the legal terms of seed and glyphosate use, employ aggressive
litigation against farmers and sustainability advocates, and shape
international trade agreements and national regulations in their
favor.14 9

In sum, since the advent of GMO technologies in the 1990s, corn
in M6xico has become highly vulnerable to foreign actors. These
susceptibilities are the result of M6xico's position as a center of origin
and center of diversity for corn, biological factors of landrace corn, the
economics of corn farming, and GMO seeds controlled by foreign
companies. As described below, the gene revolution in farming occurs
in a political-economic context that is specific to the moment while
following historic trends. Legal doctrine also plays a vital role in
framing the ultimate result.
III. Mi'XICO'S BIOSECURITY LAW INCENTIVIZES GMO FARMING
A series of legal instruments provide GMOs the governmental
support needed to capitalize on the economic gains and scientific
innovations of this technology. This Part describes this specifically
relating to corn in M6xico. The LBOGM is a biosecurity regime that
regulates GMOs on its face while also placing a series of hurdles for any
precautionary measures. With this, foreign seed companies have
become the most significant actors in GMO permit requests in M6xico,

Syngenta, and BASF have been reduced to four companies with a series of
corporate mergers, in the form of Bayer (buying Monsanto), and ChemChina (buying Syngenta),
Corteva (uniting Dow and Pioneer-Dupont). Regardless, "Monsanto" is the name used in most of
the commentaries and news on GMO corn in US, Mexican, and international sources. Less
frequently, "Bayer-Monsanto" or "Bayer" is used. For the descriptions of the mergers between
Bayer and Monsanto, ChemChina and Syngenta, and Dow and Dupont to form Corteva, see
Kristina Hubbard, The SoberingDetails Behind the Latest Seed Monopoly Chart, CIVIL EATS (Jan.
11, 2019), https://civileats.com/2019/01/11/the-sobering-details-behind-the-latest-seed-monopolychart/ [https://perma.cc/J9LJ-5MJT]; Dan Barber, Save Our Food. Free the Seed., N.Y. TIMES (June
7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/07/opinion/sunday/dan-barber-seed-companies.html?smid=pl-share [https://perma.cc/P6WF-M8MQ]. Monsanto will be used as a brand
name for seed and input products. See Joe Fassler, Why the Monsanto Brand Getting Retired Is a
Good Thing for the GMO Debate, NEW FOOD ECON. (June 4, 2018), https://newfoodeconomy.org/bayer-monsanto-brand-name-acquisition-gmo [https://perma.cc/WU5B-GHPQ].
149.
See generally Rebecca Bratspies, Owning All the Seeds: Consolidationand Control in
AGBiotech, 47 ENVTL. L. 583, 602 (2017); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms
and Justice: The InternationalEnvironmental JusticeImplications ofBiotechnology, 19 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 586 (2007); Boyd, supra note 64.
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and the Mexican government rarely denies their petitions to release
GMO seeds.
A. The LBOGM Regulates GMOs and Refers to
PrecautionaryPrinciples
In 2005, M6xico passed comprehensive GMO regulations15 0
pursuant to its constitution, 15 1 its status as a party to the Cartagena
Protocol, 152 and international law on biodiversity. 153 Referred to as the
LBOGM, this law created the central framework for regulating
GMOs in M6xico.

154

The LBOGM's primary objective was to simplify

biosecurity regulations and meet CBD requirements after a de facto
moratorium was placed on GMOs in 1999.155

150.
LBOGM, supra note 43. For a brief description of the LBOGM proposal and its
emphasis on agriculture versus environmental regulation, see Jean Foyer & Christophe Bonneuil,
La Bioseguridad Mexicana: Una "Actuaci6n de Seriedad", 77 REVISTA MEXICANA SOCIOLOGIA
37 (2015), http://revistamexicanadesociologia.unam.mx/index.php/rms/article/view/46615/41863
[https://perma.cc/GM75-H4C8], translated and revised in Jean Foyer & Christophe Bonneuil,
Mexican Biosafety as "Performanceof Seriousness": Distancing and the Transgenic "Contamination" ofMexican Maize 12 (HAL Paper No. 01092208, Dec. 8, 2014), https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01092208/ [https://perma.cc/S3ST-G2AU] [hereinafter Mexican Biosafety]. For a
description of the limited legislative discussion and the competing political interests behind the
LBOGM, see Edit Antal, Interacci6n Entre Politica, Ciencia y Sociedad en Biotecnologia. La
Regulaci6n de los Organismos GeniticamenteModificados en Canaday Mixico, 3 NORTEAMtRICA
11 (2008), http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/namerica/v3nl/v3nla2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BKR9REP8].
See GUTItRREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 99. This includes Constituci6n Politica de
151.
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 05-02-1917, 61timas
reformas, DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.), art. 73(XVI)(4a) (providing Congress power to adopt measures);
art. 4 (affirming a right to live in an environment adequate for human development); art. 4, ¶ 5
(stating it is a human right to have a right to a clean and healthy environment and its enjoyment);
art. 1 (stating that liability is created for whoever is responsible for environmental damage and
deterioration).
See Gupta & Falkner, supra note 106, at 33.
152.
153.
See Jos6-Antonio Serratos-Hern6ndez, Bioseguridad y Dispersi6n de Maiz
Transginico en Mixico, 92-93 CIENCIAS 130, 136 (2008). For a general description of corn
regulations in accord with GMO protections pursuant to the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol, see
Peralta & Marielle, supra note 131, at 441-43. For the international legal history of the CBD and
the precautionary principle, see GUTItRREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 97-101.
154.
For a basic description of this framework, government agency responsibility, permit
application process, and legal norms, the USDA issues an annual report on biotechnology in
M6xico. See GAIN MX8050, supra note 2, at 1. For a more detailed summary of this, LBOGM
legislative history, and its process for devising new regulations, see Juan Antonio Herrera
Izaguirre et al., Mexico's Environmental Law in the GMO Era, 1 MEx. L. REV. 121, 140-55 (2008).
155.
Serratos-Hern6ndez, supra note 153, at 134.
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The Cartagena Protocol is the main international treaty
addressing GMOs.15 6 The protocol sets up an international framework
for the safe transfer, handling, and use of GMOs; the protocol attempts
to avoid adverse effects on conservation and biodiversity, including
risks to humans and risks from the cross-border movement of GMOs. 15 7
During the negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol, Global South states
and pro-GMO states heavily debated to what extent this international
agreement should limit GMO technologies.15 8 Various Global South
states insisted that the protocol include the precautionary principle.15 9
The Cartagena Protocol includes a precautionary principle specific to
biotechnology in article 10:6.160 It asserts that states may take
socio-economic considerations" and concerns over biodiversity into
account to employ precautionary measures. 161 Specifically, it says that
a "[1]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge .

.

. shall not prevent [a country]

from

[rejecting transgenic imports]."162 Despite these articulated powers,
states will likely have to justify their precautionary measures with
"sound science."163
M6xico has a unique relationship with the Cartagena Protocol
regime, following its norms 164 with limited effect. It is the only North
American country to agree to the protocol. 165 After this, M6xico had to
implement its own national law on the matter. 166 At that time, the
country did not yet have any laws or regulations specifically addressing

156.
Specifically, the protocol addresses "living modified organisms." Cartagena Protocol,
supra note 42, art. 3(k). The protocol came after the call in the CBD. See id. art. 19, ¶ 3. The
protocol was signed by 103 countries and was supported by pro- and anti-GMO positions, despite
the United States not agreeing to it but being heavily involved in its negotiations. See Applegate,
supra note 76, at 63, 63 n.209. For a description of the protocols protracted debate and opposition
by the United States and other pro-GMO countries, see McAfee, supra note 51, at 30.
For the basics of the protocol and its relationship to Mexican law, see GUTItRREZ
157.
GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 65, 97, 183.
158.
See Sumudu Atapattu, The Significance of International Environmental Law
Principles in Reinforcing or Dismantling the North-South Divide, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 102 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2015).
159.
See Meyer, supra note 84 (describing the efforts of the "African Group," Peru,
Thailand, and Venezuela).
160.
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 42, at 8.
161.
Id. art. 26.
162.
Id.
See McAfee, supra note 51, at 31.
163.
164.
See GUTItRREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 65, 65 n.146 (reporting that the protocol
entered into force on September 11, 2003, and was published in M6xico's Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n on October 28, 2003).
165.
See ANTAL ET AL., supranote 21, at 17.
166.
See GUTItRREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 65.
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biotechnology. Despite this, it is argued that a series of legislative and
political delays after the protocol opened M6xico to GMO corn. In
particular, the LBOGM was implemented five years after the
Cartagena Protocol was agreed to, and scientific studies on GMO corn
risk were not widely published until 2009.167 Moreover, the major

responsibility to regulate GMOs has been left to the secretary of
agriculture, and not environmental authorities. 168
While the LBOGM refers to the precautionary principle specific
to GMOs, 169 it is criticized as being insufficient. The law includes the
power to designate protections for center of origin and center of
diversity, 170 as well as the power to designate GMO-free zones. 171 These
are consistent with Cartagena Protocol norms. 172 Mexican corn experts
characterize the LBOGM as privileging support for biotechnology while
excluding or minimizing input from ecologists, anthropologists, and
environmental scientists. 173 They explain that the LBOGM simplified
regulation in order to attract biotechnology investments, following a
long line of neoliberal reforms.1 74 Because of this perception, the
LBOGM is often called La Ley Monsanto, meaning "Monsanto's law."175
As described below, there are four main criticisms to the LBOGM: its
discretionary nature, its exceptions from precautionary protections, the
corn regime's limited scope, and its conflicting objectives. 176

See Alvarez-Buylla et al., supra note 12, at 15.
167.
168.
Serratos-Hern6ndez, supra note 153, at 131.
169.
See Reglamento de la Ley de Bioseguridad de Organismos Gen6ticamente Modificados
[RLBOGM], art. 9.IV, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] 18-03-2005, (Mex.).
Id. arts. 86-88.
170.
Id. art. 90.
171.
172.
See GUTIERREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 41, 41 n.66 (noting that the same
definition of biodiversity is used in CBD art. 2 and LBOGM art. 3:XIII).
See Serratos-Hern6ndez, supra note 153, at 139; Le6n Oliv6 et al., Etica y
173.
Transginicos: El Caso del Maiz en Mixico, in EL MAiZ EN PELIGRO ANTE LOS TRANSGtNICOS 313,
320 (Elena Alvarez-Buylla & Alma Pineyro-Nelson eds., 2013).
174.
See Jos6-Antonio Serratos-Hern6ndez & Alejandra Celeste Dolores Fuentes,
Bioseguridad y Conservaci6n del Maiz Nativo en Mixico, in EL MAiZ EN PELIGRO ANTE LOS
TRANSGtNICOS, supra note 173, at 249, 266.
175.
Mixico. Suprema Corte InualidaDecreto que Declarabaa Yucatdn <<Zona Libre de
Transginicos>>,RESUMEN LATINOAMERICANO (Aug. 15, 2019), http://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2019/08/15/mexico-suprema-corte-invalida-decreto-que-declaraba-a-yucatan-zona-librede-transgenicos/ [https://perma.cc/QW9V-692U].
Seven criticisms of the law include the competing objectives of regulation and
176.
promotion of GMOs, the limited public participation in its creation, that there are no
precautionary-principle mechanisms, the fact that GMO and landrace corn cannot coexist with
open-air pollination, the GMO industry's position serving as regulator and promoter of GMOs, that
there are no mechanisms to avoid conflict of interests, and that no liability mechanisms are
provided as required by the Cartagena Protocol. See ANTAL ET AL., supra note 21, at 22.
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On its face, the LBOGM contains substantive regulation for corn
and controls harms from GMO cultivation. Precautionary measures are
provided for in article 9:IV. 177 Scholar Alicia Guti6rrez GonzAlez argues

that these measures reflect the precautionary principle under the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (the "Rio Declaration")
and the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures. 178 The secretary of agriculture reviews and
approves or denies any permits for GMO planting that request
experimental, pilot, and commercial plots. 1 79 For each permit, it
conducts risk assessment on a case-by-case basis.

18 0

Guti6rrez GonzAlez

criticizes that the LBOGM does not define what a risk is.181 She adds
that the LBOGM does not allow for a lack of knowledge to support a
finding of a risk. 182 The diversity and origin criteria, specifically needed
for corn protection, were never precisely defined by the LBOGM when
it was passed in 2005.183 The LBOGM mandates a specific regimen to
protect corn.184 These regulations were not issued in 2005, and, after a
great deal of public controversy, they were only issued in 2009.185 Given
the political and controversial nature of any GMO corn regulation,
Mexican presidents have been hesitant to announce specifics of the corn
regime.18 6

B. The LBOGM Regime Has Four Significant Weaknesses
The first criticism of the LBOGM is that its precautionary
measures are discretionary. Article 9:IV articulates precautionary
reservations, but it lacks any explicit guidance on what measures can
be taken or from where its authority is derived.1 87 It does not mention
any specific international treaty, Mexican law, or customs.

188

The

LBOGM, supra note 43, art. 9:IV.
See GUTIERREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 118 (referring to principle 15 of the Rio
and articles 5:6 and 5:7 of the WTO Agreement).
LBOGM, supra note 43, art. 13:111.
Id. art. 61:1.
GUTIERREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 124.
Id. at 125.
See ANTAL ET AL., supranote 21, at 22.
LBOGM, supra note 43, art. 2:XI.
185.
See ABBY KINCHY, SEEDS, SCIENCE, AND STRUGGLE: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
TRANSGENIC CROPS 38-39 (Mun S. Ho ed., 2012).
186.
See Mexican Biosafety, supra note 150, at 13.
187.
See GUTIERREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 118-19 (referring to the contrast between
the Rio Declaration principles on the one hand and LBOGM article 9 precautionary principle and
article 63 risk assessments on the other hand).
188.
LBOGM, supra note 43, art. 9:IV.
177.
178.
Declaration
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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Cartagena Protocol only states that "potential adverse effects" warrant
precaution, while other treaties include more specific harms to
employ precaution.18 9 Mexican experts have criticized the LBOBM's
precautionary protections as discretionary since the law limits state
powers to what is "in accord with [M6xico's] capacities."19 0
A second critique is that the LBOGM specifically carves out an
important exception to precautionary-principle measures. It states that
any precaution must "take into account international obligations" to
which M6xico has agreed. 191 Landrace corn advocates fear that a lack of
guidance and compliance with other international obligations open the
door to exceptions. A potential argument for the government or the seed
companies is that M6xico's international economic obligations preempt
precautionary measures. This could arguably be for investors from
NAFTA, from WTO trade in services or goods, or for trade in GMO
patents under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). 192 Similar obligations are anticipated soon.
The USMCA is expected to provide new legal protections in the form of
trade in biotechnology and intellectual property for plant varieties. 193
The third criticism is that the special corn regime does not
provide enough protection for corn biodiversity in M6xico. The
LBOGM's specific corn regimen was delayed and not issued until 2009.
It is seen as insufficient for various reasons.1 94 A key component of this
regime is that it lists what geographic locations mandate protection
from GMO farming. A complaint is that these regulatory maps divide
locations as "center of origin" or "center of diversity," suggesting that

189.
Cartagena Protocol, supra note 42, art. 10, ¶ 6. But see CBD, supra note 45, pmbl.
(using "threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity"); U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change art. 3, ¶ 3, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 (using "serious or
irreversible damage").
190.
See Serratos-Hern6ndez & Fuentes, supra note 174, at 258-59.
191.
See LBOGM, supra note 43, art. 9:IV.
192.
International legal agreements may limit M6xico's ability to take precautionary
measures. NAFTA protects investors from the United States and Canada from regulatory
measures amounting to expropriation. See NAFTA art. 1110(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. (prohibiting state parties from "indirectly nationaliz[ing] or expropriat[ing] an
investment"). Specifically, NAFTA chapter 17 requires that M6xico provide a series of IP
protections consistent with international treaties. See id. art. 1701(2). Moreover, TRIPS has been
argued to provide protection for GMO corn seed companies in M6xico. See Kathleen McAfee, Corn
Culture and Dangerous DNA: Real and Imagined Consequences of Maize Transgene Flow in
Oaxaca, 2 J. LATIN AM. GEOGRAPHY 18, 32-33 (2003).
193.
See discussion infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
194.
See Oliv6 et al., supra note 173, at 320. For an explanation of center of origin and
center of diversity, see Ovando & S6nchez, supra note 14, at 19, 23-27.
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only one type of protection can be extended.19 5 Specifically, critics argue
that the criteria for center of origin and center of diversity in LBOGM
articles 86 and 87 are insufficient to meet the LBOGM's objectives. 196
Furthermore, critics argue that the Mexican regulations resulting in
these maps for corn were prepared without public input. 197 The
secretary of agriculture only solicited input from the biotechnology
industry. This excluded participation from differing scientific opinions,
corn farmers, and concerned members of the public. 198 Food advocates
complained about how requirements of public notice and comment were
ignored. 199 Likewise, the legislative and regulatory process approving
the corn regime was argued to be lacking procedural transparency. 200
Lastly, critics argued that the maps for the corn regime did not
specifically identify where landrace corn was grown. 201
Moreover,
there have been repeated delays in the
implementation of the corn regime. 202 LBOGM corn regime regulations
were not issued until 2009, four years after the LBOGM referred to
them in 2005. The corn origin and corn diversity regulatory maps were
not issued until 2012, three years after the regulations. Amid these
delays, the secretary of agriculture began issuing experimental GMO
corn permits in 2009.203 With these regulatory delays, many scientists

195.
See Jos6-Antonio Serratos-Hern6ndez, La Ley de Bioseguridady los Centros de Origen
y Diversificaci6n, in ORIGEN Y DIVERSIFICACION DEL MAfz 87, 89 (Takeo Angel Kato Yamakake et
al. eds., 2009) (referring to art. 3:VIII and 3:IX); Serratos-Hern6ndez & Fuentes, supra note 174,
at 260.
196.
See id. at 95.
197.
See Oliv6 et al., supra note 173, at 320. For a description of input requirements in
Mexican law, see Miguel R6bago Dorbecker et al., Litigio Estradgico Contra la Siembra de Maiz
GeniticamenteModificado en Mixico, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (2011).
198.
See Oliv6 et al., supra note 173, at 320.
199.
See Dorbecker et al., supra note 197, at 271; Peralta & Marielle, supra note 131, at
445.
200.
See Dorbecker et al., supra note 197, at 273.
201.
Ana de Ita, Reservations of Maize: Centers of Origin and Diversity, JORNADA (Dec.
4, 2011), https://www.jornada.com.mx/2011/12/04/economia/024a leco [https://perma.cc/3AZTZPRG], translatedin Reservations of Maize: Centers of Origin and Diversity (Alice Brooke trans.),
http://ceccam.org/sites/default/files/Reservations%/o200fP%20Maize.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BZW2T7DY].
202.
For descriptions of the corn regulation publication, draft proposals, and center of
origin map controversies, see FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN MX1100, MEXICO: MAPPING MEXICAN
CORN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BIOTECH DEVELOPMENT (2011); FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN
MX2055, MEXICO: BIOTECH CORN FACES MORE HURDLES IN MEXICO 2 (2012); FOREIGN AGRIC.
SERV., GAIN MX2051, MEXICO: AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY ANNUAL: MEXICO CAUTIOUSLY
MOVES FORWARD WITH BIOTECHNOLOGY (2012); FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN MX2082, MEXICO:
CENTERS OF ORIGIN FOR CORN PUBLISHED IN FEDERAL REGISTER (2012).
203.

(2011).

FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., GAIN MX 1102, MEXICO: 2010 BIOTECH CORN PERMITS ISSUED
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see precautionary measures as the only way to protect landrace corn
from GMO pollination risks. 204
The fourth criticism is that the LBOGM has conflicting
objectives: both to regulate and to encourage GMOs. Specifically, it
states that it aims to regulate GMO agriculture and its environmental
impacts. 205 This regulatory goal conflicts with the law's other objective
to support research of GMOs. The objective to support research should
exist in M6xico's law on science and technology and not specifically in
the LBOGM regulation framework. 206 One example of environmental
regulation's secondary status is the limited authority allotted to the
secretary of the environment and natural resources for overseeing
environmental regulation. This agency does not issue permits or review
petitions for them; its regulatory role is confined to consulting
individuals and companies in the permit process. In this light, the
permit emphasizes biodiversity and the environmental objectives less
than perceived agricultural needs.
C. Foreign Seed Companies Capitalize on LBOGM Gaps
Seed companies have used these regulatory gaps to gain a
foothold in M6xico. Since the LBOGM, foreign companies are the
overwhelming majority of actors soliciting GMO permits for corn and
other products. In August of 2017, the Centro de Estudios para el
Cambio en el Campo Mexicano (CECCAM) confirmed this in a long-term
study examining thirty years of GMO farming in M6xico. 2 07 This helps
paint a picture of what is at stake beyond the commercial permits for
GMO corn, whose review has been suspended for years in Colectividad
del Maiz.
The study explains that nineteen commercial permits for GMO
corn were submitted, but, due to the Colectividad del Maiz lawsuit, they
were suspended without any denial yet.2 08 Specific to GMO corn, foreign
farms made the most permit requests and held the majority of
approvals during the thirty-year interval during which the study was
204.
See Alvarez-Buylla et al., supra note 12, at 155.
205.
See LBOGM, supra note 43, art. 1.
206.
See Serratos-Hern6ndez, supra note 153, at 139 (referring to Ley de Ciencia y
Tecnologia [LCT], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 05-07-2002 (Mex.)).
207.
MEXICANA,

See DANIEL SANDOVAL VAZQUEZ, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS PARA EL CAMBIO EN EL CAMPO
TREINTA AIOS DE TRANSG NICOS EN MfXICO

(2017),

http://ceccam.org/sites/de-

fault/files/30_ailos-transgenicos.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP4Q-NED5]. For a brief description of the
study, see Ang6lica Enciso L., Transnacionales Buscan Apoderarse del Territorio para
Sembrar Transginicos, JORNADA (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.jornada.com.mx/2018/02/16/sociedad/033n1soc [https://perma.cc/UV7G-BKT9].
208.
See VAZQUEZ, supra note 207, at 18.
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conducted. CECCAM explains that there have been 327 requests for
GMO corn permits (noncommercial), with 194 approved and 42
denied. 209 Monsanto and Pioneer-Dupont made 70 percent of these
requests. 210 Other foreign companies making requests include Dow
Agrosciences and Syngenta. 2 11 Approvals have been issued for 169
experimental permits and 26 pilot permits (i.e., noncommercial). 2 12
These permits would allow for plots in ten Mexican states. For non-corn
GMO crops, there have been 853 permit requests. 213 Monsanto has
made 54 percent of these. 214 So far, the Mexican government's record is
that only one out of eight permits are denied. 2 15 As such, most GMO
permit requests are approved by the secretary of agriculture.
IV. COLLECTIVE ACTION TEMPORARILY SUSPENDS GMO CORN

In response to the perceived weakness of the LBOGM corn
regime, a demanda colectiva challenged the Secretary of Agriculture in
2013 and succeeded in having courts order precautionary controls for
GMO corn since then. While the lawsuit challenges GMO regulations,
given the magnitude of the biodiversity risks, it raises larger
constitutional questions regarding court powers and collective action
litigation. As described in Part V, these issues shape M6xico's sovereign
authority over biodiversity.
A. With a New Collective-Action Law, the Colectividad Sues to
Stop Commercial GMO Corn
M6xico's collective-action law opened up an avenue for landrace
corn advocates by providing plaintiffs a means to seek to stop
government approval for GMO permits. As mentioned, the plaintiff, the
Colectividad, succeeded in having a trial court enjoin the Mexican
government from approving any commercial petitions for GMO corn. 2 1 6
On July 5, 2013, the Colectividad filed a demanda (complaint) in court,
requesting that the secretary of agriculture suspend approval of
209.
Id. at 12.
210.
Id. at 18.
211.
Id. at 12.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
Id. at 9.
215.
Id.
216.
As mentioned, this Article refers to "Colectividad del Maiz' as the lawsuit and
"Colectividad" as the collective, or colectiva, formed for litigation. Technically, the group and
lawsuit have the same name, since the organization was only created for the lawsuit, but in order
to distinguish between lawsuit and the collective, two different designations are used.
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commercial permit petitions for GMO corn. 2 1 7 The Colectividad is
a plaintiff group-a collective entity similar to a class-made up of
fifty-three persons and representing twenty organizations. 218 These
organizations include campesino farmers, beekeepers, artists,
researchers, environmentalists, indigenous-rights advocates, and
human-rights advocates. 219 The collective formed to try to stop
government approvals of GMO corn permits with the lawsuit. It
updates and increases public awareness of the lawsuit through
webpages, press releases, social media, and media presence. 220 In this
dispute, Monsanto applied for commercial permits to plant GMO corn
in over a million and half acres in Sinaloa, a state in northern M6xico
where industrial corn farms are widespread. 22 1 Along with Monsanto,
seed companies Syngenta, Dow Agro Sciences, and Pioneer-Dupont are
parties to the lawsuit. 2 2 2 The primary defendant named in the

complaint is the secretary of agriculture, but the secretary of the
environment and natural resources and the aforementioned companies
are also listed as defendants.
For over six years, this litigation has attracted international
attention and concern from the Mexican public. The public sees this
fight in domestic courts as a contest to validate Mexican efforts to
protect biodiversity and to maintain future genetic diversity. 2 2 3 Put

simply, domestic laws set the table to legitimize precautionary
measures or to disaffirm them. On its face, the dispute challenges

217.
See GAIN MX8050, supra note 2; Juez Suspende Emisi6n de Permisos de Siembra de
Maiz Transginico en Mixico, ANIMAL POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.animalpolitico.com/20 13/10/juez-suspende-emision-de-permisos-de-siembra-de-maiz-transgenico-en-mexico/#axzz2ilNlpmif [https://perma.cc/6KF2-L89F].
218.
Quienes
Somos,
DEMANDA
COLECTIVA
MAiz,
http://demandacolectivamaiz.mx/wp/quienesomos/ [https://perma.cc/WJS9-77LU] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
219.
Id.
220.
See Demanda Contra el Maiz Transgenico, supra note 5; Boletines de Prensa,
SEMILLAS VIDA, http://www.semillasdevida.org.mx/index.php/informacion/boletines-de-prensablog https://perma.cc/KG56-XJT9] (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
221.
See Burns, supra note 8, at 644; David Alire Garcia, Monsanto Sees ProlongedDelay
on GMO Corn Permits in Mexico, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2017, 7:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-monsanto/monsanto-sees-prolonged-delay-on-gmo-corn-permits-in-mexicoidUSKBN15E1DJ [https://perma.cc/N9PZ-43VH].
222.
Futuro del Maiz de Mixico Estd en Manos de Magistrados de Primer Tribunal
Colegiado en Materia Civil, SEMILLAS VIDA (Jan. 23, 2017), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20171003230430/https://www.semillasdevida.org.mx/index.php/documentos/articulos/93-boletines-de-prensa/219-23-enero-2017.
223.
For a good summary of how litigation will impact M6xico's corn diversity, problems
with the LBOGM, and the significance of corn, see Timothy Wise, Monsanto Meets Its Match in the
BirthplaceofMaize, supra note 127.
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regulatory approval procedures, demanda colectiva rules, and court
powers to enjoin government agencies. But much more is at stake.
Because of political and popular resistance to GMO corn, the
presidency of Felipe Calderon did not approve commercial permits for
GMO corn before it left office in December of 2012.224 Instead, it left the
inevitable controversy for the next presidency, from another political
party. Barely half a year into the Enrique Pefia Nieto presidency, the
Colectividad initiated a lawsuit that continues to this day.
Submitted in July of 2013, the Colectividad's demanda alleges
three basic points regarding the illegal release of GMOs, their impact
on collective rights, and consequential harms to biodiversity. 2 2 5 First, it
claims that there is unauthorized release, voluntary and involuntary,
of GMO corn. This takes place in locations without permitted
authorizations. Second, this unauthorized release negatively impacts
the human rights of conservation, sustainable use, and participation
in the biodiversity of corn landraces, and it surpasses the limits set by
the LBOGM. Third, agricultural biodiversity will suffer if there is
large-scale release of GMO corn, as commercial permits would
authorize. The complaint refers to legal norms in the Mexican
constitution, Mexican procedural and environmental law, and
international law. 2 2 6

The Colectividad took advantage of M6xico's collective-action
law, 22 7 implemented the prior year. It provides litigation rights similar

to class actions in the United States. 228 The Colectividad filed a
224.
See Anne Sewell, Mexico's Decision on GM Maize Postponed Until Next Year, DIGITAL
J. (Nov. 24, 2012), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/337603 [https://perma.cc/28SJ-GBR3].
225.
See Demanda Contra el Maiz Transgenico, supra note 5.
226.
Id. The specific laws cited include: Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 05-02-1917, 61timas reformas,
DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex.); C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [CFPC] Libro Quinto, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 02-24-1943 (Mex.) (Federal Code of Civil Procedure); LBOGM,
supra note 43; Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y Protecci6n al Ambiente [LGEEPA], Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 28-01-1988 (Mex.) (General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection); CBD, supra note 45; Cartagena Protocol, supra note 42; the Nagoya
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising
from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, openedfor signature Feb. 2, 2011,
3009 U.N.T.S. A-30619 (entered into force Oct. 12, 2014); and "entre otros" (among others).
227.
C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [CFPC] art. 578, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [DOF], 02-24-1943, 09-04-2012, formato PDF, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/6.pdf [http://perma.cc/44PB-877L] [hereinafter Collective Action Law].
228.
See Neal R. Marder & Andrew S. Jick, Collective Actions in Mexico: Similarities,
Differences, and Implications, 13 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 1213 (Oct. 26, 2012). For the basics of
&

M6xico's collective-action law, see SPENCER WEBER WALLER & ANDRE FIEBIG, 2 ANTITRUST

AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 20:11 (4th ed. 2020). For how collective actions compare with class
actions in the United States, see Marder & Jick, supra. For a description of how collective actions
have developed since the 2012 implementation, see Adri6n Magallanes & Rodrigo Barradas,
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complaint as a colectiva "in the strict sense" for a group of individuals
with indivisible rights whose rights can be identified. Created for
litigation, such colectivas must be comprised of at least thirty members
with shared legal claims or shared factual circumstances. 22 9 Amending
M6xico's Federal Code of Civil Procedures, the collective-action law
allows complaints filed as environmental claims and consumer claims
from private or public plaintiffs. 2 30 For actions like Colectividad del
Maiz, possible relief includes injunctive, declaratory, and monetary
damages. 2 31 The Colectividad has only sought injunctive relief.
Procedural rights in the collective-action law gave the
Colectividad immediate leverage. Specifically, defendants in demandas
colectivas must reply to the complaints within five days. 2 32 For
Colectividad del Maiz, this effectively required the secretary of
agriculture to quickly respond in court to claims of illegal release of
GMO corn. For collective actions, courts have broad powers as the
litigation continues, including requiring updates to the colectiva,
imposing conditions on the defendant, and requiring amended
allegations. 233 In this dispute, the Colectividad benefited from these
specific court powers, keeping the dispute alive and halting approvals
of commercial permits for GMO corn. Since the collective-action law was
new at the time, with many legal issues undetermined, a great deal of
the litigation focused on specific issues, such as standing for a
colectiva, 234 amparo(individual rights) belonging to seed companies and
government defendants, and court powers in the form of injunctive
actions before trials and conditions placed on the defendants. 235 Even
though these intricate legal issues feed the courtroom developments, at
its heart the dispute centers around whether there was an illegal
release of GMO corn in M6xico and if commercial GMO corn farming
will be authorized.

Mexico, in THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW 304, 310-11 (James H. Carter ed., 8th ed.

2017).
229.
See Collective Action Law, supranote 227, art. 579. This type of action is distinct from
diffused collective actions and homogenous individual actions, which are also permitted in M6xico.
Id. art. 581.1-III.
230.
Id. art. 578.
231.
Id. art. 581.1-III.
232.
Id. art. 590.
233.
Id. arts. 586, 587.
234.
GAIN MX3087, supra note 47.
235.
For a description of how environmental-law claims would pose procedural
complications for the new collective-action regime, see Vincent, supra note 47.
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B. A Collective-Action Lawsuit Evolves into a Dispute About
Biosecurity and Sovereignty
Over six years, the Colectividad del Maiz lawsuit has proceeded
in four important stages. Their effect is to incrementally shift a dispute
regarding administrative procedures and injunctive measures to a
complex debate about constitutional demarcations of governmental
authority. On October 13, 2013, the first step occurred when the trial
court enjoined the secretary of agriculture from approving any
commercial permits for GMO corn in M6xico until a final verdict was
reached in this lawsuit.2 36 Judge Jaime Eduardo Verdugo justified the
injunction because there was a "risk of imminent harm to the
environment," catching immediate attention from anti-GMO advocates,
seed companies, and the US Department of Agriculture. 237
Specifically, the court made three significant findings. First,
there was an unauthorized release of GMO corn in M6xico via
unauthorized activities occurring in locations where such release was
not legally permitted. Second, this release of GMO corn results in the
impairment of legal rights. These rights include human rights, as
well as extensive interests in conservation, sustainable use, and
participation in the biodiversity of landrace corn, according to the limits
and restrictions set by the LBOGM. Third, the court concluded that any
commercial authorization for GMO corn would surpass LBOGM limits
and impair these legal rights. 238
Based on these findings, it ordered the Mexican government to
do three things. First, the government had to stop any action tending to
authorize the release of GMO corn into the environment. Second, it was
similarly ordered to stop any proceedings that would tend to authorize
this GMO corn release for commercial, pilot, and experimental permits.
This order had to be implemented without considering any scientific
studies supporting the defendants' likelihood of success. Consequently,
this court effectively embraced precautionary-principle measures.
Third, the government had to suspend the authorization of any permits
for experimental, pilot, or commercial GMO corn. 2 39
The lawsuit's second step took place on August 19, 2015, when
the government won its appeal and the order was found to be
236.
See Nota Informativa, supra note 2; Sustainable Pulse, Mexico Judge Orders Total
Ban of GM Maize Crops over Environmental Harm, SUSTAINABLE PULSE (Oct. 12, 2013),
https://sustainablepulse.com/2013/10/12/mexico-judge-orders-total-ban-of-gm-maize-crops-overenvironmental-harm/#.XTItGi2ZMOq [https://perma.cc/V4BA-X2VV].
237.
See Sustainable Pulse, supra note 236.
238.
See Nota Informativa, supra note 2.
239.
Id.
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inconsistent with the collective-action law. 2 4 0 At this time, Monsanto
sought five permits to plant GMO corn. 2 4 1 The judge's opinion reasoned
that there was insufficient proof that GMOs hurt the health of
consumers or the environment. 242 After news of this, Monsanto
announced that it planned to double its sales in M6xico in the following
five years. 243
The third step occurred on March 8, 2016, when an appeals
court-the Segundo Tribunal Unitario en Materias Civil y
Administrativa-affirmed the initial trial court order, instituting
precautions over GMO corn and overturning the government's 2015
victory. 244 The injunction was found legal without reviewing evidence
that GMO corn is harmful or safe for the environment, effectively
confirming that precautionary measures could proceed to protect
biodiversity. Adding force to these safeguards, the court required
monitoring and reports from the secretary of agriculture for existing
experimental and pilot GMO corn permits.

245

The court feared that

these GMO permits allowed genomes to be released and plots to be
maintained without sufficient controls. The Colectividad was permitted
to monitor these existing cultivations for harms that were not just
limited to genetic transfer from GMO corn, which includes the potential
negative impact of glyphosate. If there were any genetic irregularities
or toxic impacts, the collective could request the court to suspend these
experimental and pilot permits. Although the court sustained the
original injunction, it noted that a higher federal circuit court, the

240.

See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV.,

GAIN MX5033,

MEXICO:

INJUNCTION LIFTED FOR

PLANTING GE CORN IN MEXICO BUT STILL ON HOLD (2015) [hereinafter GAIN MX5033].
241.
Karen Graham,Monsanto EyeingMexico's Indigenous Corn Varieties, DIGITAL J. (Jan.
17, 2016), http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/monsanto-eyeing-mexico-s-indigenous-cornvarieties/article/454988 [https://perma.cc/ECY8-F23U].
242.
GAIN MX5033, supra note 240, at 2-3; Injunction Lifted for Planting GE Corn in
Mexico but Still on Hold, AG PROF. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.agprofessional.com/article/injunction-lifted-planting-ge-corn-mexico-still-hold [https://perma.cc/ZCZ4-V2AN].
243.
See Graham, supra note 241.
244.
For a brief description in English of the litigation steps until this point, see Mexico
GMO Maize Ban Given New Life After Appeal Ruling, SUSTAINABLE PULSE (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://sustainablepulse.com/2016/03/09/mexicos-gm-maize-ban-set-to-continue-after-appeal-ruling/#.XTDZqyB7ncs [https://perma.cc/4EBB-VARW]. A more detailed chronology in Spanish
is available at Martin Hern6ndez Alc6ntara, Celebran Tercer Aiio de Suspensi6n de Siembra de
Maiz Transginico en Mixico, JORNADA ORIENTE (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.lajornadadeoriente.com.mx/puebla/siembra-maiz-transgenico-mexico [https://perma.cc/Y6LL-UHXT].
245.
For analysis on the specifics of the ruling and its conditions, see Edith Martinez, Qud
Pasa con el Maiz Transginico en Mixico?, BLOG GREENPEACE MEX. (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-mexico/es/Blog/Blog-de-Greenpeace-Verde/qu-pasa-con-elmaz-transgnico-en-mxico/blog/55865/ [https://perma.cc/7GPC-UFHU].
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SCJN, or a finding of an amparo right violation could overturn this
order. 246
In 2017, the fourth step at the appeals court shifted the lawsuit
to an inquiry about constitutional law and made it increasingly likely
that the SCJN would have to resolve the brewing issues. Specifically,
on November 24, an appeals court, the Primer Tribunal Colegiado en
Materia Civil del Primer Circuito de la Ciudad de Mixico (the "Primer
Tribunal Colegiado"), affirmed the order from the trial court issued four
years earlier. This Primer Tribunal Colegiado finding came after the
SCJN denied review of Monsanto's petition, similar to an interlocutory
appeal, requesting the court to bypass a ruling by the Primer Tribunal
Colegiado.247 The appeals court ruled that the injunction remained
effective until the SCJN decided on the pending legal questions. 248 The
foreign seed companies argued in court that the ban should be lifted. 2 4 9
The Colectividad presented seed company arguments as focusing on
procedural matters, emphasizing what courts can or cannot examine,
in order to stop the courts from reviewing the scientific evidence on
GMO corn. 2 50 Specifically, the Primer Tribunal Colegiado ruled that it
lacked the competence to decide if pretrial injunctions in collective
actions were constitutional. 2 51

246.
See Sin Embargo, DerrotaparaMonsanto en Mixico: Detienen ParcialmenteSiembra
deMaiz Transginico, OPINI)N (Mar. 8, 2016), https://1aopinion.com/2016/03/08/derrota-para-monsanto-en-mexico-detienen-parcialmente-siembra-de-maiz-transgenico/
[https://perma.cc/5SX9L3QK]. For Colectividad reporting on this, see Boletin de Prensa 25: Tres Ailos de Protecci6n
Juridica a las Siembras de Maiz, SEMILLAS VIDA (July 6, 2016), http://www.semillasdevida.org.mx/index.php/documentos/articulos/93-boletines-de-prensa/209-06072016
[https://perma.cc/M6PM-FH76].
247.
See Ang6lica Enciso & Gustavo Castillo, Rechaza la SCJN un Amparo de Monsanto
Sobre Maiz Transginico, JORNADA (May 12, 2017), https://www.jornada.com.mx/2017/05/12/sociedad/038nlsoc# [https://perma.cc/9BZC-SJQM].
248.
Adriana Barrera, Mexico Court Rejects Appeal to Lift Transgenic Corn Ban:
Lawyer, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-corn/mexico-courtrejects-appeal-to-lift-transgenic-corn-ban-lawyer-idUSKBN 1DP05F
[https://perma.cc/6AQKQGNB]; Mathieu Tourliere, Se Alarga Suspensi6n Contra Siembra de Maiz Transginico
en Mixico; Decisi6n Va a la SCJN, PROCESO (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.proceso.com.mx/512536/se-alarga-suspension-contra-siembra-maiz-transgenico-en-mexico-decisionva-a-la-scjn [https://perma.cc/RAM3-7SN5].
249.
Barrera,supra note 248; Burns, supra note 8, at 644.
250.
See Futuro del Maiz de Mixico Estd en Manos de Magistrados de Primer Tribunal
Colegiado en Materia Civil, Boletin de PrensaDCM27-23012017, SEMILLAS VIDA (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.semillasdevida.org.mx/index.php/93-boletines-de-prensa/219-23-enero-2017
[https://perma.cc/THA6-KEFR].
251.
See Tourliere, supra note 248; Ang6lica Enciso L., Sin Respuesta de
Sagarpa y Semarnat, Acci6n Colectiva Contra Transginicos, JORNADA (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/03/28/sociedad/036nlsoc?fbclid=IwAR2ziXjEEtBNIMJr8jh48QlWz5sUfFg28v4xpoAxF3cb5gobv7-xmA65Qw [https://perma.cc/E96Y-HHKT].
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This November 2017 finding had the significant effect of placing
the question squarely within a constitutional inquiry about judicial
powers. Since the seed companies would inevitably appeal the Primer
Tribunal Colegiado ruling, this step shifted the issue to M6xico's
highest court. The Primer Tribunal Colegiado did not determine
whether courts had the legal powers to enjoin the secretary of
agriculture. In sum, during this fourth step, the appellate court and
SCJN findings, along with the extended nature of the dispute, suggest
that Mexican courts have had an ambivalent role in deciding whether
GMO corn is safe. 2 52 Regardless, six years after the Colectividad started
its collective action, M6xico still has not approved any commercial
permits for GMO corn. This effectively evades making larger
determinations in constitutional and biosecurity law. As described
below, this has the effect of shaping how M6xico's sovereign authority
is framed.
In addition to these litigation developments, the USMCA 253
will adapt support for GMOs, likely requiring M6xico to limit its options
for precautionary controls. The USMCA does not directly abrogate
any precautionary-principle controls in Mexican law, including the
LBOGM, collective-action law, or environmental treaties. The USMCA
is the first trade agreement the United States negotiated that covers
trade in biotechnology, including not only GMOs but also gene editing
and potential future developments.254
The USMCA will likely lead to two important changes for GMO
corn. First, USMCA chapter 3 focuses on agriculture. It states nothing
specifically about corn but effectively sets up a default to support
biotechnology. 255 Chapter 3 increases the burden for any precautions
by requiring an importing country to refute evidence from the
biotechnology exporter. 256 Moreover, the USMCA benefits GMO
exporters by requiring M6xico to take into account any risk assessment
made by US or Canadian regulators. 2 57 This effectively means that

252.
See Sergio Ricardo Hern6ndez Ordonez, La Bioteenologid Agricola en el T-MEC: Un
Contenido PosiblementeAsimitrico,FOREIGN AFF.: LATINOAM RICA, (Nov. 10, 2019), http://revistafal.com/la-biotecnologia-agricola-en-el-t-mec-un-contenido-posiblemente-asimetrico/
[https://perma.cc/UA89-ALDN].
253.
USMCA, supra note 50.
254.
Id. ch. 3: Agriculture, art. 3.12, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/03_Agriculture.pdf.
255.
Id. art. 3.14. It explains that USMCA objectives are to encourage trade in
biotechnology and to not disrupt trade in biotechnology. Id.
256.
Id. art. 3.15:2, 3.15:3.
257.
Id. art. 3.15:3(d).
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Mexican regulators would have to defer to foreign risk assessments or
similar assessment by an exporter.
Chapter 3 does not state anything specifically about the
precautionary principle, but it does point to regulatory privileges for
seed companies. It requires that risk management be "without
unnecessary delay" and be "appropriate to achieve compliance with its
laws and regulations." 258 As an additional benefit that disincentivizes
precautionary-principle measures, chapter 3 states that the evidentiary
requirements placed on importing countries, in this example M6xico, do
not apply to penalties.

2 59

In this light, the USMCA tries to dissuade

precautionary controls of transgene risks by requiring a series of
evidentiary and procedural benefits for seed companies. But if these
companies are just assigned a penalty, then they avoid the complex
evidentiary debate over scientific risks. If M6xico indeed assigns a
penalty, then the GMO import is not prohibited, and the company can
then just absorb the economic costs. This avoids the fear of closing the
Mexican market, which has been an overwhelming complaint by the
United States since 2013, and it evades any discussion of biodiversity,
transgenes, or maiz nativo.
Second, in substantive terms, the trade agreement attempts to
harmonize IP rights protections for plants, which would be the most
direct concern for landrace corn protection. The fear is that M6xico
would need to open up its market to GMO corn because the USMCA
requires IP protections for trade-in corn from the United States or
Canada. The USMCA attempts to shift the requirements from that
agreement to another international agreement, the 1991 version of the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(the "UPOV 1991").260 M6xico is a party to the prior version of this

convention, which did not include most protections that GMO and
biotechnology interests prefer. Maiz nativo advocates argue that UPOV
1991 dilutes needed protections by extending IP protections for plants
from the current ten years to twenty or twenty-five years. Similarly, it
makes seed saving and seed exchanges illegal. 2 6 1 These are traditional
and widespread practices for Mexican corn farmers. They are central to
nurturing corn's biodiversity.
In sum, these expected changes from the USMCA come after
four stages of legal developments in the Colectividad del Maiz. Since
258.
Id. art. 3.15:3(c).
259.
Id.
260.
Id. ch. 20: Intellectual Property Rights, art. 20.7:2(d), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/20-Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf.
261.
Silva Ribeiro, T-MEC: Al Peor Pastor, JORNADA (June 22, 2019), https://www.jornada.com.mx/2019/06/22/opinion/019a leco [https://perma.cc/484C-STCS].
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2013, these stages have converted debates about GMO permits into
larger questions about constitutional authority and sovereignty. When
the USMCA is implemented in M6xico, Canada, and the United States,
legal support for GMO corn will adapt accordingly.
V. COLONIALITY FRAMES SOVEREIGNTY IN A CORN FIGHT
For years now, the legal dispute over GMO corn in M6xico has
remained unresolved. Since initiated in 2013, the Colecticidaddel Maiz
lawsuit has raised a fundamental question regarding state authority. 26 2
It effectively asks whether M6xico's sovereignty gives M6xico the
authority to defend itself from perceived harms to biodiversity or
whether it requires M6xico to protect the rights of foreign economic
actors. The authority to defend itself is rooted in the precautionary
measures under the LBOGM and international environmental law. The
obligation to protect the economic rights of foreign interests comes from
the IP regime under domestic and international economic law. These
questions continue traditional legal debates about when states may use
their sovereign powers to protect their residents, territory, and natural
resources. Historically, foreign states and military forces posed these
threats. Today, irreversible damage to biodiversity poses the same
threat.
To unpack this present and anticipated future issue, this Article
takes two methodological steps: it identifies a "sovereign moment," and
it applies decolonial theory. 263 First, in analytical terms, a sovereign
moment illustrates how domestic laws and international authority are
interpreted to confront unsettled terrain concerning national authority.
Here, this includes responses to biosecurity. So far, courts have been
responsible for these actions as trial proceedings continue and M6xico's
legislature starts changing national policies on corn. 2 64 In the future,
262.
See Demanda Contra el Maiz Transgenico, supra note 5.
263.
A sovereign moment is an event in which a state's sovereign powers strengthen or
weaken due to a change in how domestic authority and international law are interpreted. This
idea is inspired by the international-law concept of the "Grotian moment." This is when a
fundamental change sparks rapid development on international-law norms. See INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 7 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985). A sovereign moment
identifies how domestic authority and international law are interpreted to fortify or to weaken a
state's sovereign powers in transnational settings. See LBOGM, supra note 43.
264.
See Nota Informativa, supra note 2; GAIN MX8050, supra note 2; Burns, supranote
8, at 643-44; supra Part III. The legislature recently approved a law to protect landrace corn. Its
implementation is pending. Named Ley Federalparael Fomento y Protecci6n del Maiz Nativo, it
does not stop the approval process for GMO corn permits. For a description of the law, see Paola
Monterrubio, Se Declara al Maiz Nativo como una Manifestaci6n cultural de Mixico, EL
UNIVERSAL (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/menu/que-implica-la-ley-federalpara-el-fomento-y-la-proteccion-del-maiz-nativo [https://perma.cc/BP3Q-D5YV]. The law was
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political remedies may lead to new regulations or policies. In this
Article, the "corn fight" is shorthand. It describes the sovereign moment
and uncertainty, exemplified by Colectividad del Maiz. Second, the
"critical" perspective of decolonial theory demonstrates how material,
normative, and ideological debates empower or weaken Mexican
autonomy regarding GMOs and biodiversity. 265
Painting the Colectividad del Maiz litigation as a sovereign
moment identifies what is at stake and how domestic and international
law work together. This takes a temporal snapshot of a complex
interplay. In simple policy terms, the case is about sovereign regulation
regarding biosecurity precaution and court injunctions as well as
responses to perceived risks to biodiversity. Doctrinally, this addresses
court roles, collective-action law, agriculture agency authority, and
international law. In material and economic terms, this pits private
interests, cross-border actors, and regulatory policy against each other.
This encompasses seed companies, landrace corn advocates, and
intermediating government entities. Each feeds into the corn fight, as
the Colectividad avers that there has been an unauthorized release of
GMO corn and that its rights are consequently implicated. 266

A. Coloniality Shapes Economic Interests, Legal Norms, and
ConceptualAssumptions
Latin American scholars use decolonial theory to examine
colonial influence in the region, even though most of these states
achieved independence from formal colonialism in the nineteenth
century. 267 Two relevant decolonial perspectives are that (1) colonialism
is central to modernity (historically and presently), and (2) foreign
actors capitalize on ideology and material reasoning to continue this
influence. 268 Decolonial theorists represent various disciplines. Their
reported in M6xico's official register. See Decreto por el que se expide la Ley Federal
para el Fomento y Protecci6n del Maiz Nativo, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DOF] 13-04-2020,
available
at
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota-detalle.php?codigo=5591534&fecha=13/04/2020
[https://perma.cc/J7VB-MS9H].
265.
See COLONIALITY AT LARGE, supra note 54, at 2-10; Vats & Keller, supra note 54.
266.
See Demanda Contra el Maiz Transgenico, supra note 5.
267.
See generally Fernando Coronil, Naturaleza del Poscolonialismo:Del Eurocentrismo
al Globocentrismo, in LA COLONIALIDAD DEL SABER: EUROCENTRISMO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES

PERSPECTIVAS LATINOAMERICANAS 87, 87-112 (Edgardo Lander ed., 2000) (placing environmental
analysis in a decolonial examination of ideology); Arturo Escobar, El Lugar de la Naturalezay la
Naturaleza del Lugar: Globalizaci6n o Postdesarrollo?, in LA COLONIALIDAD DEL SABER:
EUROCENTRISMO
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113-144
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critical descriptions look at the interplay and continued influence of
colonial history, economic choices, and conceptual assumptions. For this
Article, this approach illustrates that foreign powers exert influence
and control over economic decisions, political authority, and ideological
concepts. This helps uncover how cultural, governmental, and economic
forces are not entirely separate but instead are often interrelated,
reinforce each other, or depend on one another.
The notion of coloniality is defined as how foreign or global
influence over a community persists after national independence, when
colonialism ends. 2 69 Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano coined the
term "coloniality," which has become a significant frame of analysis for
decolonial scholars. 270 Coloniality identifies how Latin America is
not just a residue of colonialism with a colonial past. 27 1 Decolonial
approaches note how there is a continuation. Importantly, in Latin
America nations, global forces have exerted coloniality for over two
centuries since national independence, and for more than five hundred
years after colonialism began in 1492.
Coloniality emphasizes a process that persists-not a condition
that ends. 2 72 In response to the effects of coloniality, Latin American
communities continually seek sovereignty and emancipation. 273 This
resistance continues to this day. There are many examples of this
resistance in Latin American history. Indigenous people and slaves
rebelled during the colonial era. Criollo (creole) and republican forces
fought for independence beginning in 1810. Peasant and mestizo
groups opposed liberalism during the nineteenth century. Class-based
socialist mobilization continued this opposition mostly after 1910. Since
1994, social movements and identity-based organizations opposed
neoliberalism. A decolonial approach notes how these examples of
resistance opposed material, political, and ideological forces from
abroad. As described below, a resolution favoring biodiversity for corn
in M6xico signals a refraining of sovereignty.
With a "matrix of power," coloniality operates. 274 1t exerts control
over a community in four domains: economics, authority, patriarchy,

269.
270.

See id. at 2, 6 n.11; Quijano, supra note 57.
See Anibal Quijano, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America, 1

NEPANTLA: VIEWS FROM SOUTH 533 (2000).

271.
See COLONIALITY AT LARGE, supra note 54, at 11, 13, 16.
272.
See Ram6n Grosfoguel, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms
of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, 1
TRANSMODERNITY: J. PERIPHERAL CULTURAL PROD. LUSO-HISPANIC WORLD 14-15 (2011).

273.
274.

See id. at 15-16.
See Quijano, supra note 270.
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and subject knowledge. 275 Doctor Walter Mignolo elaborates on these
domains. The economics domain, for example, refers to how foreign
actors appropriate land, exploit labor, and acquire natural resources. 276
The authority domain regards control over institutions such as the
army or the state. 277 Finally, the patriarchy domain manages how
gender, sexuality, and family life are experienced. 278
The subject-knowledge domain shows how knowledge is
colonized. It illustrates who creates concepts. Quijano and Mignolo
explain that with this domain, coloniality shapes expressions, beliefs,
and references to the supernatural. 279 It determines modes of
knowledge by delineating who is a subject. 2 80 A subject can produce
knowledge, perspectives, images, and idea systems over resources.
Simultaneously, coloniality determines who is an object and who cannot
produce knowledge.
As a simple example of the subject-knowledge domain, the
Spanish crown far away in Europe was able to colonize large
populations in the Americas for over four centuries with the help of
ideas like Christianity and mercantilism. Spain capitalized on how
conceptual references were made, justified, and produced. These
references framed Spain's political, economic, and religious control over
colonies. Mercantilism, imperialism, and Christianity informed local
assumptions on law, family, sex, and the environment.
Coloniality ensured that indigenous communities were objects of
these conceptual references. These communities did not produce how
knowledge was used in economic, political, or religious systems, as
subjects would. Complex belief systems that supported large
civilizations and their material, political, gender, and scientific
assumptions existed throughout the Americas before 1492. Incan and
Aztec empires relied on ideological assumptions about commerce,
government, technology, and nature. Coloniality allowed Spain to rule
over this region and contain local resistance for centuries. This
perspective helps identify how state power (authority), concepts
(subject knowledge), and economic decisions work together.
Coloniality needs cultural and economic power to support each
other. As a matrix, coloniality hides hierarchies by shifting where
resistance takes places. The effect is to create multiple jurisdictions or

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See id. at 557; Mignolo, supra note 55, at 155-56.
See Mignolo, supra note 55, at 155-56.
See id.
See id.
See Quijano, supra note 270, at 541; Quijano, supra note 57, at 169.
See Quijano, supra note 270, at 541.
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locations where opposition manifests. 28 1 This is similar to the concept of
intersectionality in feminist critical studies-the notion that gender,
race, and class work to subordinate women. 282 As an example of
coloniality, the notion of race was created in order to divide labor classes
and to accumulate capital for monarchs early in the Spanish empire. 283
This Article isolates similar dynamics evident in GMOs, biodiversity,
and intellectual property.
Coloniality currently focuses on knowledge as production. 284 For
biotechnology, knowledge or the intelligent use of capital is key to
economic gain. 2 85 This differs from a physical means to exploit natural
resources. 286 IP rights are used to expropriate knowledge and threaten
biodiversity. 287 In this light, colonial economic policies protect and
control access to information. 288 These protections affect a country's
foreign policies, depending on whether it is an importer or exporter of
biotechnologies.
Throughout Mexican history, coloniality has had an evolving
role in shaping the country's sovereignty. From the Spanish empire to
the present, coloniality has exerted its influence in economic and
conceptual terms over M6xico's status as a colony from 1512 to 1820, its
equality with other sovereign states after national independence in
1821, its state authority following the Mexican Revolution in 1910, and
its market regulation during the period of neoliberalism (most obvious
with NAFTA in 1994). When M6xico was a colony, the decolonial terms
were "silver" and "Christianity." In the nineteenth century, the legal
terms, liberalism, property rights, and national independence framed
coloniality's influence. After the revolution, nationalist politics and a
state-driven economy shaped coloniality's influence. Most recently, a
neoliberal emphasis on market access and privatization characterizes
the political economy.
For each period, coloniality confronted different legal tools and
conceptual sensibilities. Specifically, coloniality framed sovereignty
over territory and persons, property rights, state autonomy, and market
access
in
the
concepts
of
colonialism,
independence,
revolution, and neoliberalism, respectively. These long-term and
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Grosfoguel, supra note 272, at 20.
See id. at 10.
See Quijano, supra note 270, at 533-36.
See id. at 540.

285.

See SANTIAGO CASTRO-GOMEz, LA POSCOLONIALIDAD EXPLICADA A LOS NinOS 80

(2005).
286.
287.
288.

See id.
See id. at 89.
See id. at 82-83.
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interrelated developments exemplify the economics, authority, and
subject-knowledge domains. Currently for the corn fight, coloniality
confronts regulation of biodiversity threats.
This Article applies coloniality's "matrix of power" as a
methodological framework to examine how sovereignty is framed. It
identifies the economic and material incentives at play, the legal
instruments and doctrines that frame M6xico's sovereignty, and the
subject-knowledge dynamics used in legal justifications. These three
steps isolate coloniality's domain over economics, authority, and
knowledge and subjects, respectively. This does not apply coloniality's
patriarchy domain. Although maiz certainly functions in this domain, 289
given the topic of the demanda colectiva, this Article focuses on the
three aforementioned domains of coloniality.
B. Coloniality Frames Debates About the Environment,
Food, and Biotechnology
Decolonial theory helps explain how foreign influences shape
food cultures (including corn in Mexican history), environmental
degradation, and biotechnology's reliance on the law. Essentially,
GMOs and other biotechnologies frame the subject-knowledge domain
to favor industry needs. 290 These technologies provide economic value
when IP owners have the legal means to enforce their rights. As such,
IP owners are the subjects and beneficiaries in the legal regimes of
biosecurity, biodiversity, agricultural policy, and investor protections.
This dynamic is reinforced when Global South states acquiesce to seed
company interests instead of asserting sovereign powers to protect
biodiversity.
Coloniality shapes how Latin American food culture evolves.
Coloniality plays a role in determining how nature is interpreted to
create food and how food is then consumed and produced. 29 1 Looking at
history, this normative impact is illustrated by the denigration of
indigenous culinary knowledge, European customs used to judge food
customs, and "fusion" cuisines appropriating food traditions more

289.
See Emma Gaalas Mullaney, GeopoliticalMaize: PeasantSeeds, Everyday Practices,
and Food Security in Mexico, 19 GEOPOL. 406, 406-430 (2014). Mullaney uses feminist scholarship
in geopolitics to examine the significance of corn. This includes farming, market sale, and
consumption choices that contest global and Mexican government visions of food security. See id.
290.
See CASTRO-GOMEZ, supra note 285, at 81-84. For decolonial analysis of intellectual
property, GMOs, and biotechnology, see id. at 83-85; Vats & Keller, supra note 54, at 790-91;
Mignolo, supra note 55, at 162-63.
291.
See Zilkia Janer, (In)edible Nature: New World and Food Coloniality, 21 CULTURAL
STUD. 385, 385-405 (2007).
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recently. Contemporary food sovereignty movements can be described
as decolonial attempts to alter how food is conceived. 292 The goal of these
movements is to make peasant and rural populations subjects in
knowledge production for food and agricultural policies. This competes
with policies that focus on agricultural exports and industrial farming.
In particular, economic and cultural assumptions shape corn's
historical role in Mexican society. The "tortilla discourses," as the
economic and cultural dynamics are described, push M6xico to search
for the "modern" and "foreign" to disenfranchise Mexicans from corn. 2 93
Historically, corn was labeled as traditional, backward, rural, or
"scientifically proven" to be the cause of M6xico's underdevelopment.
Neoliberal economic policies favor corn market liberalization with
elimination of protective tariffs, state subsidies for its production,
and state-sponsored grocery stores. Publicly, this is presented as
economically beneficial by eliminating expensive government
regulations and by opening access to foreign investors. At more local
levels, though, corn price increases effectively separate Mexican
consumers from a product central to daily diets and national cuisine.
This illustrates how neoliberalism treats corn within coloniality's
economic, authority, and subject-knowledge domains.
Scholars apply decolonial methods to examine the economic,
political, and ideological influences contributing to environmental
problems in Latin America. Anthropocentric assumptions prioritize
human use of nature. 294 Centuries of colonizing populations created
lasting environmental impact. There is a problematic decoupling of
cultural diversity from environmental questions. 295 Cultural loss is
intrinsic to biodiversity, since indigenous communities live in
territories with intense biodiversity. There are tangible assumptions
that certain communities in the Global South cannot contribute to
civilized society. Centuries of damage continue from monocrop farming.
These factors imply that Latin American communities are economically
dependent on disrupting nature.296
292.
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Law is central to coloniality's influence on environmental
problems in terms of creating and responding to these challenges. For
example, in the context of mining in Colombia, coloniality capitalizes on
environmental and human-rights law. 2 97 It does this with national
regulations working in favor of foreign interests while outlawing
small-scale mining. Similarly, environmental justice in debates about
environmental disasters, energy access, and biofuel in Puerto Rico,
Pakistan, and the Philippines reflect decolonial struggles. 298
With respect to the corn fight, law provides GMO technologies
the force to cross borders and succeed internationally. The agricultural
benefits of GMOs do not solely explain their extensive use. Whether in
the form of IP rights, international trade protections, seed licenses, or
domestic regulations, law is vital to GMOs' commercial growth. Critical
IP scholars make sophisticated connections between law, biotechnology
interests, and the Global South. For example, Hoodiagordonii, a plant
used by indigenous communities in South Africa to combat hunger, was
patented by pharmaceutical interests. As part of this, patent law poses
Western knowledge as superior and presents science as culturally
neutral. 299 Contemporary claims of neutrality for patents and science
resemble historic trends for patents in early capitalist expansion.
British law in the late fifteenth century added property rights
dimensions to patents-that is, the means to exclude another party's
use. 300 Before this, patent ownership did not include this exclusionary
function. Doctor Laura Foster shows how similar economic motivations
fueled patenting Hoodia, a plant extensively known for centuries to
have these properties. 301
Scholars also show how the biotechnology industry benefits from
cross-border governance, which protects the industry's legal benefits
while disenfranchising those without IP rights from their legal
claims. Biotechnology is deeply embedded in empire making. 302 These
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liberties and the movement of goods and services. In India, rights-based
governance explains extensive GMO use in commoditizing seeds.3 03
There, the language of rights allows GMO companies to enjoy legal
entitlements by claiming scientific innovation. This duplicity or slyness
is labeled the "cunning of rights." 304

C. Coloniality Molds the Corn FightBetween Protecting
Biodiversity or GMO Corn
Ultimately, Colectividaddel Maiz will result in coloniality siding
between two divergent positions. Pro-biodiversity and pro-GMO
perspectives wait for the courts to settle subject-knowledge dynamics.
These positions protect collective rights and biodiversity or protect IP
rights in GMO corn, respectively. Eventually, the court will decide
whether biodiversity or intellectual property is the proper subject in
contests about GMO regulations. This sets a normative trajectory for
law to follow: to protect landrace corn or GMOs.
In two steps, this Section describes how coloniality currently
operates in Colectividad del Maiz before a resolution has been reached.
First, it presents the complexity of GMO corn debates in M6xico. Myriad
concerns, from scientific debates to questions about morality and
technology, inform the corn fight. Second, this Section describes how
three domains of coloniality-economics, authority, and subject
knowledge-frame issues in Colectividad del Maiz.
1. Debates About GMO Corn Reflect Anxieties About
Humans, Technology, and Nature
Colectividad del Maiz involves much more than suggested in its
legal argumentation regarding environmental, administrative, and
constitutional law. The pro-GMO view paints pro-biodiversity
perspectives as irrational and impeding the purported benefits of
biotechnology. 305 The US Department of Agriculture exemplifies this
view. In periodic reports, it describes legal, policy, news, and research
trends relevant to agriculture in M6xico. Importantly, it has cast
biodiversity developments in a negative light. It has said Colectividad
del Maiz "has stymied corn research" and has "stalled public-sector
biotechnology researchers." 306 It has described Mexican public
303.
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perceptions on GMOs as "cultural prejudices," Mexican media coverage
of GMO corn as "emotional," and court rulings as "thwart[ing] the plans
of biotechnology companies" and "derail ing] work that could boost corn
yields." 307
These descriptions help frame how the law is applied. They
reflect
expected conceptual disputes between pro-GMO
and
pro-biodiversity perspectives. This results in a long-standing debate
about the precautionary principle. The ideological clash is between
claims of stopping harms and claims of stopping innovation. 308 Since a
court-ordered suspension in 2013, this framework has set the terms of
reference for legal and public examinations of GMO corn.
Assumptions about how technology intervenes in nature fuel
opposing positions. On its face, the lawsuit addresses what scholars Joel
Wainwright and Kristin Mercer describe as GMO corn controversies at
the scale of "landscapes," which are focused on ecosystems and the
environment. 309 At this level, an inquiry examines biodiversity and how
genetic diversity evolves. 31 0 But, as Wainwright and Mercer explain,
GMO debates simultaneously occur on five other scales, including the
scales of "genes" for biotechnology, "organisms" for animals and plants,
"producers" for farmer and household economics, and "culture" for
maiz's everyday significance. 31 1
This Article argues that GMO corn controversies in M6xico can
only be settled at a sixth "natural order" scale, as Wainwright and
Mercer describe. 3 12 This scale determines metaphysical questions about
technological interventions in nature. 3 13 At this scale, GMO corn's
perceived negative effects regard morality. At this level, GMO policy
must decide if this technology disrupts nature and should be outlawed
because of it. This differs from examining technology and its
consequential impact on a genetic, organismic, socioeconomic, or
cultural levels.
For the natural order scale, questions far larger than GMO
permits feed the debate. For Colectividad del Maiz, landscape concerns
carry legal arguments in courts, keeping the issue in legal and public
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discourse, but controversies remain unsettled at the other levels.
Divergent opinions exist with controversies at each scale. At the gene
scale, questions regard how science interprets genetic interactions. For
the organisms scale, debates are unresolved regarding how genetically
engineered organisms alter plant life. Similarly, landscape
controversies question how these organisms, needed inputs, and
monocrop farming alter the environment and animal life. For farmers,
uncertainties include how socioeconomic factors impact the use of
GMOs. At the cultural scale, the dispute asks if corn's role (daily,
symbolic, and spiritual) should change for Mexican society. Because of
ideological clashes for each of these five scales, a lawsuit about GMO
corn forces questions about natural order.
2. Questions About Farming Economics, Legal Authorities, and
Concepts Frame the Corn Fight
A decolonial approach shows how conceptual concerns regarding
nature and technology will resolve Colectividad del Maiz. As litigation
proceeds, the GMO corn fight develops along coloniality's three
domains: economics, authority, and subject-knowledge dynamics. For
economic incentives, GMO interests seek to guarantee their access to
Mexican commercial corn markets. This is the economic domain's most
obvious incentive. Pro-biodiversity and pro-GMO interests articulate
defined and well-known positions, emphasizing scientific assumptions
and claims of increased productivity. 3 14
Coloniality's economic domain fuels far more than just an eyeing
Mexican demand. For corn in M6xico, coloniality's economic domain
emphasizes privatized research, protects IP rights in corn seeds, and
eliminates state support for domestic corn farmers. This addresses
more than just corn and GMO seeds. Socioeconomic factors heavily
influence how a supply and demand for GMO corn function. As an
example, M6xico has not been self-sufficient in corn since before NAFTA
was enacted in 1994. Around this time, biotechnology, in its early
development, had succeeded with privatized research, which has been
common in the industry since then. 315 This makes knowledge a
commodity that benefits from legal-rights enforcement. To emphasize
this, decolonial scholars explain that knowledge becomes a form
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of economic production, much like resource extraction, commodity
exports, or industrialization did in the past. 316 Doctor Santiago
Castro-G6mez describes coloniality manifesting itself with knowledge
as production and the intelligent use of capital, most obvious in
biotechnology.
Exemplifying this domain, many Mexican farmers choose not to
plant GMO corn for economic reasons. It requires monocrop farming,
intensive input use, and industrial-scale planting. 3 17 Commercial GMO
corn seeks to enter M6xico for agricultural use, but this comes after
economic displacement of small-scale farmers and elimination of price
controls nationwide. Since reforms began eliminating farmer support
and protective corn tariffs in 1988, this displacement has been
continual. Doctor Jos6 Antonio Serratos-HernAndez paints a common
policy thread from economic reforms in the 1980s favoring foreign
capital, to biotechnology interests urging simplified biosecurity
regulations during the presidencies of Fox and Calderon from 2000 to
2012.318 The Colectividad del Maiz dispute began after these regulatory
reforms.
GMO seed companies try to displace domestic corn production
and its needed labor. Doctor Le6n Oliv6 explains that the LBOGM was
enacted in 2005 to favor economic interests of increased production. 3 19
By primarily emphasizing increasing national output, the LBOGM and
its corresponding framework allocated negative impacts on corn
farmers. GMO seeds require different forms of production with
monocrop agriculture, industrial farms, intensive input use, seeds sold
by foreign companies, and single-use seeds with legal limitations
intrinsic to IP rights.
These recent changes in economic production operate like
coloniality's prior objectives. Throughout M6xico's history, such
changes took place with law serving economic and conceptual aims. The
encomienda system secured indigenous labor as the Spanish colony was
founded. Later, during colonialism, mining and subsoil rights protected
access to minerals. Not long ago, a series of privatizations of public
services and Mexican industries changed the state's economic role.
Beginning in 1988, these neoliberal reforms emphasized markets and
minimized public intervention in the economy. Each of these historic
changes benefited foreign economic interests, but only after
corresponding legal and conceptual support was developed. Specifically,
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the encomienda system supported the empire, colonial control helped
foreign interests access the subsoil, and neoliberal reforms helped
access the market. Exemplifying how this domain operates currently,
food-system scholar Timothy Wise describes "free trade" and NAFTA as
the biggest threat to M6xico's corn diversity. 32 0

Economic objectives similarly influence proposed solutions to
protect corn's biodiversity. In this regard, legal and scientific arguments
are not the only way to support the Colectividad's goals. Doctor Takeo
Angel Kato provides a comprehensive list of economic measures to
protect corn's center of origin and center of diversity, more so than the
LBOGM and its corn regime. 321 These include public support for
research focused on landrace corn and the more than two million
small-scale farmers. 322 These farmers are the guardians of biodiversity.
Support could include subsidies, technical assistance, and rural
economic development. When the LBOGM framework was
implemented in 2005 and 2009, this kind of support had been stripped
away with neoliberal reforms during the prior two decades. It is
perpetually debated whether to evaluate these socioeconomic factors as
proposed solutions to biodiversity challenges or as harms caused by
GMOs and neoliberal policies.

32 3

For Colectividad del Maiz, legal doctrine operates as coloniality's
authority domain. Described most simply, when resolved the dispute
will determine if M6xico is a corn landrace protector, regulator of corn
GMOs, or commercial market for GMO seeds. Without the lawsuit
initiated in 2013, corn seed companies would be able to capitalize on
LBOGM's protections for GMO farming. As the demanda started,
Monsanto doubted that its commercial GMO corn permits would be
denied, since the secretary of agriculture had overwhelmingly approved
prior experimental and pilot permit requests. 324
Law operates as a default to protect GMO access and to bolster
government support for biodiversity. The law determines whether a
governmental entity uses its sovereign powers to protect biodiversity or
to stop GMO permits. When litigation started, the LBOGM supported
pro-GMO assumptions in the regulatory process through its default
position that GMO permits were authorized and that burdens
were placed on precautionary measures. 325 Specifically, precaution
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required refuting three assumptions from the LBOGM: (1) GMO corn is
safe, (2) GMO corn is the substantial equivalent to landrace corn, and
(3) GMO corn benefits from scientific consensus regarding safety and
equivalence. Court orders suspending approval of GMO corn permits
since 2013 weaken the conceptual support for these assumptions.
This domain could confirm one of two legal positions: benefitting
pro-biodiversity or pro-GMO interest.
Without a resolution in Colectividad del Maiz, the authority
domain remains unclear. The dispute proceeds, making determinations
that help clarify coloniality's authority regarding GMO corn. These
include the legal actors, the scope of legal protection, institutional
determination, and international autonomy. In terms of legal actors,
the dispute can side with collective rights or the rights of IP owners.
Early in litigation, the defendants legally challenged demanda colectiva
procedures and the Colectividad's standing. 326 These arguments were
made since the collective-action law was still new then. The
Colectividad has argued that biodiversity is negatively impacted by the
unauthorized release of GMO corn genomes. 327 For six years of
litigation, seed companies have argued that court-ordered suspensions
infringe upon their amparo rights. 328 Recently, seed companies have
challenged scientific evidence from the Colectividad, authored by
biotechnology experts and public agencies from M6xico and the
European Union, that GMOs and glyphosate increase the risk of
lymphoma. 329
For the scope of legal protections, anti-GMO advocates argue
that biodiversity is at risk, with corn's center of origin and center of
diversity impacted. This wide scope, along with the collective rights of
a colectiva, emphasizes how protections have a broad reach not limited
to individualized harms. Pro-GMO interests highlight how legal
protections belong to an investor or to an IP owner, with their harms
and procedural protections being more concrete.
Similarly, M6xico's biosecurity regime, the LBOGM enacted
in 2005, initially excluded protecting landrace corn. When passed,
the law required a corn regime, but it was not officially issued until
2009.330 These multiyear delays provided GMO permit applicants-for
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example, the defendant seed companies-procedural benefits while
simultaneously avoiding protection for landrace corn. This legal
maneuver threatened M6xico's biodiversity in corn.
The institutional power to make these decisions remains
undecided by this case. One position benefits corn advocates. This
position is that the judiciary makes these inquiries, continues reviewing
the demanda colectiva, and orders an agency to stop its reviews of
applications for commercial GMO corn permits. The contraposition is
that decisions on these permits and on what should be allowed belong
to the executive or the legislature. This would focus on secretary of
agriculture procedures or the norms provided in the LBOGM. Lastly,
M6xico's international autonomy is to be determined here. It could
conceivably point to its sovereign and police powers to regulate GMO
corn and protect biodiversity, or it could interpret USMCA, NAFTA, or
WTO rules to require that it stop precautionary measures.
The subject-knowledge domain points to the dispute's most
challenging determination, since it decides what concepts justify a
resolution between collective or individualized values. Here, the general
question pertains to whether the law's role is to stop or permit
biotechnological intervention in nature. Specifically, it examines the
impacts, if any, on biodiversity from commercial GMO corn permits.
This asks if M6xico will permit widespread GMO corn farming. If the
answer here sides with the Colectividad, legal reasoning would see the
subject as biodiversity, identifying collective rights and harms.
Alternatively, siding with seed companies and authorizing commercial
permits, the subject of the legal inquiry would be individual rights and
specific harms to IP owners. Determining the subject of these legal
questions sets in motion a normative path for GMO regulation.
Designation of a subject leads to normative determinations,
shaping whether actions are permitted or disallowed. Scientists accuse
biotechnology interests of controlling access to information about the
impact of GMOs. Seen in decolonial terms, this operates as a subject
producing knowledge. Regarding landrace corn in M6xico, various
scientific studies emphasize the importance of how transgenes are
detected. 331 They explain that biotechnology and biodiversity
perspectives use different methods. Moreover, it is argued that the
biotechnology industry is not transparent about its fields and lab tests,
which would support these findings. 332 In this regard, justifications for
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GMOs try to control what information-or knowledge, in decolonial
terms-can be used to examine the impacts from biotechnology.
A decolonial approach helps in clarifying what has been called
the "scientization of politics." 333 Biotechnology interests try to shift

public debates about GMOs to a narrow argument about science and
risks. This Article contends that a decolonial examination illustrates
how this debate evolves. It shows how designating a subject prioritizes
a specific judgment that the law makes. This can be for the subject of
collective rights and biodiversity. Alternatively, it can select the subject
as IP owners with individual rights and singular harms.
If the Colectividad succeeds, commercialization of GMO corn
would be stopped because of a series of assumptions focused on a
collective scope versus an individualized one. Most important,
biodiversity and the need to avoid harms to genetic varieties in corn
plants would motivate judicial reasoning. Seen in litigation terms, a
collective action-a demanda colectiva-allows for this as opposed to
claims made by an individual plaintiff. 334 A prohibition on GMOs would

prioritize the potential injuries to biodiversity. 335
The Colectividad points to harms from GMOs that impact
biodiversity. This view emphasizes that nature and ecosystems suffer
from changing the genetic structure of corn plants. These harms are
incremental and not immediate. Were the Colectividad to be victorious,
such rulings would empower the policy and legal view that biodiversity
should be protected. This position is currently not the subject in the
LBOGM or in US approaches to GMO regulation. Presently, regulations
applied to GMOs focus on measuring risks and the equivalence of
genetic engineering. 336 If dispute resolution sides with anti-GMO
advocates, this would suggest how regulations can shift the focus of
biosecurity regulation, with an eye to the harms of genetic engineering,
through commercial cultivation of a widespread crop.
This view motivates precautionary measures. Specifically, out of
concern for corn's center of origin and center of diversity, widespread
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333.
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GMO planting would be illegal. This legal inquiry prioritizes avoiding
this risk. It does this even at the cost of losing the benefits of GMOs
or at the expense of individual rights belonging to GMO permit
applicants. 337 These risks could be avoided even without scientific
certainty. Importantly, a pro-biodiversity subject would prove that
there is no scientific consensus on the safety of GMOs, questioning
safety for humans, plants, animals, and genetic diversity. 338 Similarly,

the harms attributed to glyphosate could strike a blow to this consensus
as well. In sum, if legal reasoning focuses on a collective subject, then
it supports a normative path that detains biotechnological
interventions. In this case, it provides conceptual backing for the
precautionary principle, prohibiting authorization for commercial GMO
corn.
A more individualized subject would result if seed companies
succeed and attain commercial GMO corn permits, with courts
reversing suspensions. This would undo court orders in Colectividaddel
Maiz that have been in place since 2013. In this light, legal reasoning
would find that risks to biodiversity from GMO corn are merited. Here,
GMOs would be found to be safe or safe enough. 339 In line with the
LBOGM, it would find evidence insufficient to overcome assumptions
regarding this safety. Put simply, GMOs are permitted because there
are more hurdles needed for the government to pursue precautionary
measures. This happens despite the precautionary principle included in
the LBOGM and international environmental law. Specific to GMO
corn, biotechnology interests are blind to the negative impacts of GMOs
because they prioritize productivity. 34 0 In a similar vein, corn advocates
focus on markets and productivity while placing no cost on the
externalities of large corn farms, such as biodiversity, soil erosion,
greenhouse-gas emission, and the dumping effect of production
subsidies. 34 1
Emphasizing the specific subject of GMOs benefits from legal
assumptions supportive of biotechnology. This includes the doctrine of
substantial equivalence, contending that GMO plants are the same as
non-GMO plants. These assumptions preclude examining the
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modifications at a genetic level for plants or more widespread harms to
plant diversity. Similarly, claims of scientific consensus on GMOs
support this. Accordingly, courts or policy makers can side with claims
of expertise. This position keeps GMO interests as the beneficiary of
regulatory regimes. The LBOGM, like other such regulations, operates
to prioritize GMOs versus making it a hurdle to approve them. In this
regard, GMO interests capture the subject-knowledge domain.
In sum, the Colectividad del Maiz lawsuit suggests that
coloniality can be reconceived along one path set by the precautionary
principle, or it can continue a paradigm encouraging GMO and IP rights
as protected in the LBOGM. By seeing GMOs as a subject, the legal
reasoning may easily side with an economic objective of increased
productivity. But if the subject is instead biodiversity or landrace corn,
then legal reasoning could emphasize more long-term and more
collective harms.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article makes three arguments about GMO corn in
M6xico: (1) Mexican regulations encourage GMO farming, prioritize
economic interests, and discourage GMO controls; (2) demandas
colectivas provide a means to use precautionary measures to protect
landrace corn; and (3) GMO litigation shapes whether Mexican
sovereignty serves to protect biodiversity or protect GMO corn.
Furthermore, this Article illustrates how economics, law, and belief
systems working together will resolve the corn fight. This uses
decolonial theory to examine coloniality's control over the economic,
authority, and subject-knowledge domains in GMO corn debates. 342
Coloniality bolsters foreign influence over Latin American communities
and shapes their sovereign responses. 343
Coloniality's three domains point to how Colectividad del Maiz
can be resolved. In economic terms, the dispute raises significant
questions regarding the socioeconomic impacts of GMO corn farming.
GMOs add to neoliberal economic disruptions in rural M6xico. 34 4 When
landrace farms are displaced, GMOs eliminate the human effort needed
to nurture corn biodiversity. GMO farms are different, with industrial
size, monocrop planting, expensive inputs, and toxic herbicides, such as
glyphosate. 345 The sovereign choice, to protect biodiversity or GMOs,
342.
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343.
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determines whether these economic impacts will happen. As Parts II
and III show, the LBOGM, international trade law, and permissive
regulations rely on economic reasoning that incentivizes GMO
agriculture.346

In Colectividad del Maiz, coloniality's authority domain focuses
on law, determining who makes the sovereign choice. For questions of
authority, legal reasoning determines whether courts or an executive
agency decide. 34 7 One position is that courts have injunctive powers
provided in the collective-action law, supporting biodiversity protection.
The contraposition emphasizes that the secretary of agriculture makes
this decision and that the LBOGM protects GMO interests.
The subject-knowledge dynamic has the greatest potential
impact to decide between protecting biodiversity or GMOs. Coloniality
designates a subject that shapes how belief systems operate and how
knowledge is produced. 348 From this, subjects in these idea systems
have greater control than nonsubjects. In Colectividad del Maiz, this
dynamic effectively decides between two subjects: biodiversity or GMO
corn. A court decision that biodiversity is the selected subject sides with
the Colectividad and emphasizes collective rights. 349 These harms are
diffused among the population and territory, contemplating the future.
This identifies the loss of genetic diversity and its irreversible effects.
It finds legal force in the precautionary principle and in court powers.
An opposing determination regards GMO corn as the selected subject,
emphasizing the individual rights that permit applicants enjoy. This
would be the result if courts rule for seed companies. This protects IP
owners with rights provided in international trade law and the
LBOGM. 350 Here, the litigation and conceptual burden would be on the
Colectividad, which would be required to disprove that GMOs do not
negatively impact biodiversity.
In conclusion, law has an ambivalent role in the GMO corn fight.
International trade law and M6xico's biosecurity law incentivize and
protect GMO corn, while a collective legal action has temporarily
succeeded in suspending commercial GMO corn. An ultimate resolution
in Colectividad del Maiz requires a paradigm shift in biotechnology
regulation, incorporating assumptions in economics, law, and belief
systems. The concept of coloniality illustrates how M6xico may use its
sovereign authority either to protect biodiversity and landrace corn or

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See supra Parts II, III.
See discussion supra notes 244, 248 and accompanying text.
See Quijano, supra note 270, at 533; Quijano, supra note 57, at 172-74.
See discussion supra notes 331-332, 337 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 49-51, 191-92 and accompanying text.
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to protect GMO interests. This decolonial perspective provides a
compelling method to examine GMO regulation. This framework could
be highly valuable beyond M6xico to leaders worldwide who worry
about GMO harms.

